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1 |  Belgium: a general introduction 
1.1 Country’s political and demographical structure 
Belgium is a federal state, composed of three language-based communities – the Flemish, the 
French and the German-speaking Community – and three territorial regions – the Flemish, the 
Walloon and Brussels Capital Region. The official languages are Dutch, French and German. 
Belgium has about 11 million inhabitants, of which roughly 60% lives in the the Flemish Region, a 
third in the Walloon Region and 10% in Brussels-Capital. The demographic structure between the 
regions differ: the population in Brussels is becoming younger while the population in the other 
two regions is growing older (CGKR, 2012). Members of the Dutch-speaking Community live in 
the Flemish Region and in Brussels-Capital, those of the French-speaking Community in the 
Walloon Region and in Brussels-Capital and those of the German-speaking Community in the 
Walloon region.  
Competencies are shared between the federal state, the regions and the communities. Besides the 
federal government, each region and each community has its own government, but the 
governments of the Flemish Region and the Flemish Community have been merged.  
The powers of the Federal state, broadly speaking, cover everything connected with the public 
interest: social security, public finances, the judicial system, labour legislation, collective agreements, 
etc.  
Regions have powers in fields that are connected with their region or territory in the widest 
meaning of the term: economy, technological development and applied research, employment, 
professional training, housing, transport, etc. 
The communities have powers in matters relating to the individual: education and fundamental 
research, assistance, health and culture. In Flanders, the Community and Regional institutions were 
merged.  
1.2 Actors and responsabilities of labour market policy and implementation 
With regard to labour market policy, the federal state is responsible for the ‘passive’ component, 
while the ‘active’ component is a shared responsibility between regions, communities and the 
federal government. However, due to the 6th state reform, important changes to labour market 
responsabilities will take place. The state reform embodies a devolution of spending responsibilities 
to the communities and regions and should be fully implemented by 2015. The regions will have 
more competences regarding ALMP: occupational training, a set of employment incentives ( e.g. 
reductions in social security contributions for specific target groups will become a competence of 
the regions while general reductions in social security contributions will stay at the federal level), 
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direct jobcreation (for example the service vouchers1) and controlling and sanctioning active 
jobsearch behavior will go to the regions (but the normative framework will stay federal). The 
transfers of competences and budgets create a window of opportunity for reform. 
 
First of all there is the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue (FOD 
WASO: Federale Overheidsdienst voor Werkgelegenheid, Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg) that guarantees the 
balance between employers and employees in their labour relations, the wellbeing of workers and 
the development of social legislation. Every region also has a department that has responsibilities 
regarding the policy domain of employment. 
 
The National Social Security Office (RSZ: Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekerheid) collects and manages the 
social contributions of employers and employees used to finance the various branches of social 
security. It collects and distributes the basic administrative data for other social security institutions. 
 
The National Employment Office (RVA: Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening) manages and activates the 
unemployment benefits. It implements certain employment measures and schemes for temporary 
working time reductions. The RVA is in charge of administering sanctions for non-compliance with 
the conditions linked to the reception of unemployment benefits, based on information provided 
by the public employment services. However, due to the state reform the implementation of 
controls and sanctions of active jobsearch behavior will go to the regions.  
 
The Federal Public Service Social Integration, anti-Poverty Policy, Social Economy and Federal Urban Policy 
(POD MI: Programmatorische Overheidsdienst Maatschappelijke Integratie) aims to guarantee a dignified 
existence to all persons who do not qualify for social security and who live in poverty. It has 
competences to activate persons on social benefits.  
 
The local social welfare offices (OCMW: Openbare Centra Voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn) run by the 
municipalities, are responsible for the administration of social welfare benefits (‘living wages’ and 
other benefits) and also offer a number of activation measures (employment and guidance in the 
employment path) and other services (for example debt settlement and budget guidance). Due to 
the 6th state reform the labour market guidance of social benefit recipients will become a regional 
responsibility. 
 
Every region in Belgium has its own public employment service (PES). VDAB is the Flemish PES, 
Forem is the Walloon PES, Actiris is the Brussels Capital PES, and the ADG is the PES for the 
German-speaking community.  
1.3 Welfare system 
 
Belgium has a well-developed social security system with universal health coverage. Employers and 
employees both pay social security contributions as a percentage of gross income.  
 
It is compulsory to register with a health insurance fund as soon as a person has an income (from 
employment, unemployment or self-employment). If a worker is not able to work due to illness or 
accident the health insurance pays a substitute income for a certain period of time.  
 
1 The service voucher scheme is a consumer subsidy introduced in 2004 to create jobs in the domestic service sector (and reduce 
informal employment) by encouraging demand for these services through highly subsidised prices. The domestic workers have a 
contract with a registered service company, but carry out the domestic work at the user’s residence. 
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The mandatory unemployment insurance is quite unique in that benefits last for the duration of 
unemployment. To be able to claim unemployment benefits workers have to be able to prove a 
sufficient number of working days during a particular reference period. School-leavers are entitled 
to it after a ‘professional integration period’ of one year (a nine month period called ‘waiting time’ 
before 2012)2.  
Social welfare benefits are paid out by the Public Social Welfare Centres (OCMW’s). Formally it 
is not the OCMW's duty to provide an income but to realise social integration preferably sought 
through employment. An instrument to realize this is the individualised project for social 
integration, a kind of ‘integration contract’ which stipulates the best fitting route to integration (for 
example through education). Only if employment is impossible or not yet possible, a person has the 
right to financial aid, called living wages. The amount is dependent on household situation.  
The retirement pension is a ‘Pay-As-You-Go system’ (Hoj, 2013) calculated according to the 
duration of the career and the received wages. The normal pension age is 65 and a full career takes 
45 years for men and women. Before 2009 the normal retirement age was 65 for men and 60 for 
women and a 45 year working career for men versus 40 years for women.  
1.4 The schooling system 
The educational system is organized by the communities. Compulsory schooling starts at age six 
and ends at eighteen. Secondary education is possible in 4 disciplines (general and technical 
education, art school and vocational training), starts at the age of 12 and is divided in three degrees 
of 2 years. Belgium’s education systems perform better than the EU average (EC, 2013a), but there 
are differences between the communities.  
The system is characterized by grade repetition and early tracking with an (implicit) hierarchical 
ordering of the tracks (from general, to technical to vocational tracks). This result in a so called 
‘cascade system’: many pupils who start in the ‘higher’ tracks are gradually forced down the 
cascade by a system of reorientation at the end of each school year. Technical and vocational tracks 
therefore attract more low-ability and discouraged pupils, which is detrimental to its image (Cockx, 
2013). Both the hierarchical ordering of the tracks and the use of retention as a policy of 
remediation is more pronounced in the French than in the Flemish Community (HRW, 2009, p. 
80). In 2008, as much as 58% of French speaking pupils had accumulated at least one year of 
schooling delay in the fifth year of secondary school, compared to 35% for the Flemish pupils 
(Cockx, 2013, pp. 8-9). 
Combining education with work is quite uncommon in Belgium. The education to work 
transition is in many cases quite abrupt as apprenticeship schemes, internships and small hours 
student jobs are not well developed (Hoj, 2013, p.16). From 16 years onwards, students in the 
vocational track can enter part-time education, but in 2008 only 3% of youth, aged between 15 and 
29 combined studying with working, while this share is 12% in the EU-15 (HRW, 2009, p. 14). 
Moreover, part-time students have many difficulties in finding employment during this period 
(Cockx, 2013).  
Overall performance is marred by early school leaving, strong differences between nationals 
and pupils with migrant background, low participation in adult learning - in particular 
2 Before 2012 individuals were entitled to these unemployment benefits (at that time called ‘waiting allowance’) for an indefinite 
period. Since January 2012, cohabitant school-leavers are only entitled to an ‘insertion allowance’ for a maximum period of three 
years. For other school-leavers, this time limit of three years starts to count only from the age of 30 (Cocxk, 2013).  
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among older workers - and varying degrees of school autonomy in the different education 
networks (EC, 2013a). 
Belgium disposes of a qualified workforce reflected in the fact that the European 2020 target 
that calls for a minimum of 40% of the population aged 30-34 to complete higher education is 
already reached (EC, 2013b). In 2010, this indicator already reached 44.4% in Belgium so that the 
2020 target has been set at 47% for Belgium. However, the number of graduates in science and 
technology is relatively low in Belgium (accounting for 15.8% of the new tertiary education 
graduates in 2008 compared to the EU average of 21.9%) resulting in a mismatch between labour 
supply and demand (EC, 2013b, p.47). 
1.5 Labour market regulation 
 
1.5.1 The employment protection legislation 
 
When looking at the OECD index for protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal 
(taking into account procedural inconvenience, notice and severance pay as well as difficulty of 
dismissal), Belgium is close to the OECD average (OECD, 2013b, p 83). With regard to collective 
dismissal, Belgium has one of the most stringent legislation in the world (Belgium has the highest 
value in the OECD of the indicator for additional provisions for collective dismissals that 
quantifies additional restrictions, over and above those for individual dismissals, OECD, 2013b, p. 
85). With regard to the regulation on temporary contracts Belgium finds itself close to the OECD 
average (OECD, 2013b, p. 92). 
It is important to take notice of the fact that in Belgium a difference is made between white and 
blue collar workers. They have different working contracts, holidays, dismissal rules, etc. This was 
ruled to be discriminatory and unconstitutional and as of 2014 the differences will be removed 
thanks to a uniform statute (‘eenheidsstatuut’) for both types of workers. According to Cockx 
(2013, pp. 4-5) Belgian employment protection legislation (EPL) is probably among the strictest in 
the OECD for high-wage white collar workers, while the reverse holds for blue collar workers. 
1.5.2 The wage setting system 
 
Belgium is a highly coordinated country, characterized by the presence of strong and influential 
trade union actors (Degryse, Jepsen, & Pochet, 2013). Collective bargaining takes place at three 
levels: national, sectorial and firm level. At the national level social partner organisations 
represented in the National Labour Council conclude an ‘interprofessional agreement’. In this 
agreement the ‘wage norm’ for maximal wage increases (with the upper limit determined by the 
expected wage developments in the neighbouring countries) and the minimum wage are set. The 
interprofessional agreement acts as a framework for collective agreements at sectorial level. These 
include various topics like industry job classification systems, which wage increases are 
implemented and in what manner as well as the method to adapt wages to inflation. Upon request 
by the signatory parties, they can be made legally binding by Royal Decree, conditional on approval 
by the government, for all companies and employees represented by the sector committee (EC, 
2013b, p.16). The sectorial wage agreements cover more than 90% of all employees (Hoj, 2013). 
Firm-level agreements are bound by the agreements concluded at sectorial level. 
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The minimum wage varies much between sectors. In most sectors a higher minimum wage than 
the one in the interprofessional agreement is negotiated (Cockx, 2013). At the beginning of 2013 
the minimum wage varied between € 7 and € 18.50 an hour (HRW, 2013, p18). Currently there is a 
phasing in of the minimum wage by age, the reduced rate is 70 percent for those aged less than 17, 
gradually increasing to 100% at age 21. This will be abolished by 2015 (Cockx, 2013). 
Belgium has a system of automatic wage indexation that is included in all sectoral wage 
agreements and takes place when the health index (a consumer price index without items such as 
transport fuels, tobacco and alcohol items) reaches a certain threshold (typically applied to public 
wages and in some private sectors) or at fixed intervals (most private sectors). The health index is 
also used for indexing benefits and other social transfers, subsidies (e.g. the service vouchers) and in 
the health care sector (e.g. doctors’ fees). This mechanism ensures that unexpected inflation 
translates into higher wages (Hoj, 2013, p.24). 
The wage system used to be age based but became slightly more flexible as a system where pay 
grade schemes are based on competence or seniority (implemented in 2007 and effective in wage 
contracts from 2009, following an EU court ruling that age based wage systems are discriminatory) 
(OECD, 2009). According to Hoj (2013, who cites Babecky et al., 2009) this results in rigid real 
wages, which forces firms to adjust labour costs via labour inputs, explaining the high take up of 
reduced working time schemes and the encouragement of older workers to leave (on early 
retirement) so they can be replaced by cheaper (because of the strong seniority element in wages) 
younger workers.  
1.6 Socio-economic structure 
The Belgian labour market is characterized by a large proportion of small enterprises. The larger 
organizations (>250 workers) represent only 0.2% of all organizations in Belgium. Small enterprises 
(<250 workers) represent 99.8% of all Belgian companies, while micro-enterprises (<10 workers) 
represent 94% of all Belgian companies (2011; source: Eurostat).  
The economy as a whole strongly depends on the public sector. As a result, the labour market is 
less sensitive to cyclical fluctuations. Furthermore, the economy traditionally relied on industrial 
sectors, including a number of vulnerable sectors such as the textile or assembly sectors. The 
important role of commercial services is reflected in high start-up and closing levels, although the 
proportion of startups is below the European average. Strong job creation in the health care sector 
and, more recently, service voucher activities, resulted in steady annual employment growth. 
Belgium has been moving progressively towards a service-based economy over the past 
decades (EC, 2013b). The tertiarisation of Belgian employment since 2007 is on a faster pace than 
before the crisis (HRW, 2013, p. 37). When comparing 2007 with 2011 (most recent data available) 
the sector of business services, which comprises the service vouchers and tempagancy companies, 
has risen in particular. In 2011 in all three regions more than 3/4th of jobs were in the service 
industry, in Brussels even 9 out of 10 jobs (HRW 2013, p 38). Government administration and 
international institutions (e.g. EU and NATO) are concentrated in Brussels resulting in a high 
demand for higher educated profiles. In 2011 25.1 % of jobs in Brussels were in the sector of 
government and education, compared to 20.4% In Wallonia and 14.1% in Flanders (Ibid).  
The industry is in decline. Whereas it represented 20 % of paid employment in 2000, that share 
has fallen to just 15 % in 2012 (NBB, 2012, p. 133). In 2011 the share of industry employment was 
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15.4% in Flanders, 12.6% in Wallonia and 4.4% in Brussels. This economic structure results in 
Flanders being more sensitive to the business cycle than the other regions. The HRW (2013, p. 64) 
illustrates this with the number of workers affected by firms intentions for collective dismissals 
from January to December 2012: 938 workers in Brussels, 3539 in Wallonia and 12 230 in Flanders. 
Belgium is still specialised in medium technological goods (which are easily substituted and are 
thus more exposed to competition from lower wage countries) and the share of high tech goods in 
total exports (despite its increase) is still below 20% (EC, 2013b)
  
  
1.7 Labour market participation 
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the socio economic position of the Belgian population (15-64 year olds), 2000-2012 
 
* Break in the data3 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek – EAK / Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt WSE/Departement WSE) 
3 Before 2011 the question about job search was not linked explicitly to a certain period of time. As of 2011 the question concerns the month of reference. Because this question is one of the criteria to determine if a 
person is unemployed or inactive according   to the ILO definitions, the data are not perfectly comparable. 
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Belgium suffers from below-average and stagnating labour market participation and high 
(un)employment disparities across regions and population subgroups. The Flemish region performs 
best with regards to activity rate, employment rate and unemployment rate. According to the 
European Commission (EC, 2013a) both issues have a number of drivers, such as the erosion of 
cost-competitiveness, high labour taxation, still low overall innovation capacity and low job creation 
potential in certain areas where the predominant industrial mix is in decline, limited labour mobility, 
persisting educational, geographical and skills mismatches and ineffective activation policies.  
 
Because of the state structure and the division of competences amongst the federal, regional and 
communal level most of the (labour market) statistics in Belgium are broken down regionally. In 
the rest of this paper we will do this as well. However, we will not always go into the regional 
differences more deeply. Regional survey data require extra caution because of differences in non-
response and small numbers of respondents (especially for Brussels capital region versus the much 
bigger regions of Flanders and Wallonia). According to our interviewees the regional level is for 
some vulnerable groups not the most relevant level to look at with regard to differences in labour 
market participation. For migrants and youth for example the urban level would be more relevant. 
In addition, we could not always find (in literature or interviews) a sound explanation for regional 
disparities. In general the regional unemployment rate differences can be ascribed to a mismatch in 
labour supply and demand and low geographical mobility (HRW, 2013). The interviewed experts of 
the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) ascribe regional differences mainly to the structure of the labour market 
and the population structure according to age, education,… 
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1.8 Structural problems of the Belgian labour market 
1.8.1 Educational, geographical and skills mismatches 
The Belgian Beveridge curve, that offsets the vacancy rate (y-axis) to the registered unemployment 
rate (x-axis), gives insight to mismatches between supply and demand on the labour market. The 
vacancy rate expresses the number of vacancies as a proportion of the labour force.  
Figure 1.2 Belgian Beveridge curve – vacancy rate* versus administrative unemployment rate** 
(percentages of labour population, yearly averages) 
* Vacancies as registered by the PESs, except vacancies from temporary employment agencies and subsidized
programs. Because of non-availability of data before April 2009 the FOREM vacancies were estimated based
on the 2000-2009 flows.
** Percentage based on the unemployed registered with RVA 
Source HRW, 2013, p 76 – Actiris, FOREM, INR, RVA, VDAB, computations by HRW 
It has moved out during the 2000s, which means that the matching process deteriorated. According 
to Hoj (2013) this probably reflects the impact of policies to activate older workers and the long-
term unemployed, which made it more likely that these groups would report some job search and 
therefore be classified as unemployed in labour-force-survey statistics. Hoj interprets the 
persistence of the outward movement as a continuing difficulty in achieving employment outcomes 
for the unemployed, especially for older groups on the labour market. The effect of the crisis can 
be seen clearly as the curve moves out sharply, the vacancy rate dropped as the unemployment rate 
went up. According to Zimmerman (2012) it’s too soon to conclude that mismatches are growing 
since the crisis. Zimmerman explains the mismatches by difficulties related to the educational level 
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and the place of residence of workers. The labour reserve counts too little higher educated profiles 
and a relatively large part is lower educated while the demand for this type of profile is relatively 
low. Brussels has the highest mismatch: the demand focusses on higher or specific profiles because 
of the government and international institutions while most of the resident unemployed are lower 
educated. Apart from skills, geographic mobility can explain part of these mismatches. In Brussels 
most of the jobs are taken up by non-residents. In Wallonia and Flanders on the other hand, a large 
part of the jobs are taken up by residents. Exchanges between these two regions are rather low as 
well as the commuting from Brussels to these regions (except to the Flemish province of Vlaams-
Brabant that borders Brussels). Zimmer identifies some structural barriers to geographical mobility 
like language, hard to reach workplaces and the costs of certain professions. 
According to our interviewees at the NBB next to the mismatches in the qualifications, there is also a 
mismatch in disciplines of study (e.g. STEM disciplines: science, technology, engineering, mathematics).  
 
1.8.2 Mobility on the labour market 
 
In Belgium, mobility on the labour market is a key problem according to several of our 
interviewees. They further agree on the presence of a dual labour market: a primary labour market 
with good conditions of employment and stable jobs and an unstable secondary market with short-
term and part-time jobs and lower wages. Transitions from the second to the first are very difficult. 
This creates outsiders who tend to move from one temporary contract to another while insiders 
enjoy high protection and greater job stability (OECD, 2013b).  
According to experts of the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue 
(FOD WASO) there is a general problem concerning the entry to the labour market. This creates insiders 
versus outsiders .The main reason is a lack of dynamism on the labour market, with respect to job-job 
mobility. They describe our labour market as a tram that is full and where nobody ever gets off. If you are not on 
the tram you have to wait a long time to get on one. After a certain waiting period people just give up. Once you are 
out, you never get back in. The experts continue that because of this most measures are targeted at getting people into 
a job but not at keeping them on the job. Vulnerable groups might need some extra support on the job.  
 
According to Bevers (2013) mobility is hampered by stringent employment protection legislation. 
Protection against dismissal can discourage dismissal but also new hires and resignations (because 
of the accumulated protection or rights). Because there is little movement on the labour market, 
new entrants can experience difficulties finding a job. This weakens the position of low qualified 
and people with a migrant background in the margin of the labour market (Bevers, 2013). 
 
The experts at the FOD WASO diagnose that it is a necessity for companies to keep their inner core of 
trained workers because they know they can’t get them from anywhere else. Workers won’t leave from other companies 
because they would lose too much acquired rights. Moreover, employees in other companies don’t invest in training 
because they assume that they will stay in that company till the end of their career.  
DynaM deciphered the mobility inside sectors in Belgium (their net mobility rate is based on 
job destruction and job creation). The governmental sectors (e.g. government administration, 
education) have low mobility but also industrial sectors (e.g. chemistry, textile) have low mobility 
(Vandekerckhove, Struyven & Heylen, 2013). 
According to the FOD WASO experts, collective bargaining and the sectoral structure, with deviating rules 
in every sector, creates segmentation. De facto there are approximately 170 bargaining units (paritary (sub) 
commities). Intrasectoral mobility is hampered because workers don’t want to lose the rights they acquired in a 
certain sector. The experts continue that the dynamics to temporarily get out of the labour market are better. 
There are a lot of measures (timecredit, pré-pensions etc.) but you have to be embedded very well in the labour market 
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to get access to these interesting measures. Only if you are an insider this is possible. They conclude that there is 
mobility for insiders not for outsiders. 
High wage costs and employment protection legislation are part of the problem according to the 
FOD WASO experts. Employers won’t risk hiring a low-educated (young) person or a migrant because the cost is 
too high. When you hire someone, it has to be right the first time. The age/seniority based wages pose a problem for 
the mobility (inter-sectorial, job-job and inactivity or unemployment to employment) of older workers.  
Figure 1.3 Employment rate (%) versus average seniority in years, (15-64 year olds, 2012) 
Source Eurostat, edited by FOD WASO (Bevers, 2013, p. 7) 
The experts at the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) agree that wage costs are of importance. According to 
them this is reflected by the success of measures which were extended during the crisis (e.g. Activa win-win which has a 
strong focus on young jobseekers and older (long-term) unemployed) addressing the high labour costs of certain target 
groups for a strictly limited period of time.  
The FOD WASO experts further state that mobility between sectors is hampered by (subjective) acquired 
rights like early retirement or dismissal compensation. The incentives to search for a new job in another sector are 
low and the incentives to dismiss employees gradually become absent because of high dismissal costs. This induces 
employers to react in shocks. A good example is the car industry in Belgium: workers don’t leave this industry 
gradually, but now and then a whole factory is closed down. 
1.8.3 Low investment in lifelong learning 
According to our interviewees at the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue (FOD WASO) the lack of mobility makes that investment in training is low. This can have effects on 
the employee side as well: because an employee stays in one job/sector for a long time he might not see the point in 
learning something new or different.  
The interviewed labour market researcher observes that the need to invest in lifelong learning (LLL) is a 
new risk because the labour market got more flexible with phenomena like jobhopping etc. Companies mainly invest 
in young employees. On the other hand older higher educated employees do participate more in training. It is possible 
that they get more opportunities from their employers and/or have more opportunities themselves to participate in 
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training. The researcher puts forward a critical remark in this debate: the Belgian educational system is 
good compared to other countries, so maybe we shouldn’t invest in LLL as much as other countries. 
 
1.8.4 Division of competences 
 
The Council of the EU recommended for Belgium a simplification and reinforcement of coherence 
between employment incentives, activation policies, labour matching, education, lifelong learning 
and vocational training policies for older people and youth (Council of the European Union, 2013). 
According to the interviewed labour union expert there used to be too much ‘waffle iron politics’, an 
expenditure policy whereby money for a project in one region always needed to be compensated by similar spending in 
the other region, which led to every region having its own vulnerable groups for which funds were needed for targeted 
policies. The lack of coordinated policies leads to low efficiency. But according to the FOD WASO experts, the 
Belgian state structure did not hamper taking swift anti-crisis measures. It does make it more difficult to design a 
coherent structural or long term labour market policy. Since 2003 there has been no structural consultation between 
the federal, regional and social partners on a general direction for the labour market. 
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2 |  Vulnerable groups on the Belgian labour 
market 
2.1 General introduction – who is vulnerable? 
 
To get a good idea of the groups that are vulnerable on the Belgian labour market we will start by 
comparing their employment and unemployment rates. The rates of the overall working age 
population in Belgium can be used as a reference level. As regards disabled people, we 
unfortunately could not find (comparable) data for Belgium. 
Figure 2.1 Employment rate vulnerable groups Belgium, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
* Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Figure 2.2 Unemployment rate vulnerable groups in Belgium, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
* Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27, in 2011 the phrasing of the questions in the LFS 
changed 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek – EAK / Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
The employment rates show that young people, older workers and non-EU nationals are among the 
population subgroups participating least in employment. With regards to unemployment, non-EU 
nationals and young people stand out with high unemployment rates. Older workers seem to do 
better with regards to unemployment, but the low rate can be explained by the high prevalence of 
early retirement systems in Belgium. According to the Council of the EU, people with a migrant 
background, the elderly and low-skilled youth do not only participate the least in the Belgian labour 
market, they are also exposed to higher risks of poverty and social exclusion (Council of the EU, 
2013). 
 
Apart from the vulnerable groups INSPIRES focuses on, two other groups are identified by our 
interviewees as particularly vulnerable on the Belgian labour market: the low educated4 and the long 
term unemployed. The long term unemployed are vulnerable because they often lack relevant work 
experience. According to an interviewed Flemish government official specialized in older workers, 
they sometimes lack certain labour attitudes, technical skills and specifically for Flanders were not intensively followed 
up by the PES before 2009. Interviewed experts from the FOD WASO also mention this lack of follow-
up (which will be intensified in the near future) in combination with the unlimited duration of unemployment benefits. 
Because this group is not an explicit priority in Belgian labour market policy and statistics are hard 
to come by, we won’t focus on this group in the report. We will however focus on the low educated 
though. According to all the interviewees this is a very important vulnerable group in Belgium. 
Interviewed officials of the NBB even named them as the most important group. Experts from the 
4 Low educated/qualified refers to pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education, medium educated refers to upper 
secondary education and post-secondary non-tertiary education and highly educated refers to tertiary education. 
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Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue (FOD WASO) point out that the 
one thing vulnerable groups on the Belgian labour market have in common is that they are often low educated. 
We will start by introducing the different vulnerable groups defined by INSPIRES, along with the 
low educated. We will search for explanations for their vulnerability by drawing on statements that 
were put forward during the interviews, supplemented with more detailed insights from research 
and expert reports.  
2.2 The disabled 
2.2.1 Who are they? 
 
(Unbiased) data on the disabled are hard to come by because there is no registry for disability thus 
survey data, self-assessments, have to be used. Disability was not systematically measured in the 
LFS before 2009.  
Table 2.1 Hindrance in daily activities (20-64 age group), 2012 
Hindrance Flemish region Brussels Walloon Region Belgium 
Yes, to a considerable extent 7.1% 8.2% 11.2% 8.5% 
Yes, to some extent 6.4% 5.8% 6.9% 6.5% 
Total with hindrance  13.5% 14.0% 18.1% 15.0% 
Without hinderance 86.5% 86.0% 81.9% 85.0% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
No Answer  0.4% 0.5% 0.8% 0.5% 
 
Source FOD Economie – AD Statistiek en Economische Informatie – EAK/LFS 2012 Bewerking: 
Departement WSE, in Samoy, 2013b. 
 
The most recent Belgian figures on disability (2012) show that 15% of the people in the 20-64 age 
group in the Labour Force Survey  (LFS) experience hindrance in daily activities from a handicap, a 
longstanding disorder or illness (work or non-work related). There are regional differences: in 
Wallonia 18.1% experience hindrance compared to 14.0% in Brussels and 13.5% in Flanders 
(Samoy, 2013b). For Belgium as a whole the employment rate in 2012 amongst people (20-64 years 
old) experiencing hindrance was 36.2% versus 72.8% for people without (FOD Economie – AD 
Statistiek en Economische Informatie – LFS 2012 Bewerking: Department WSE). The gap is 36.6 
percentage points (ppts). According to a Flemish government expert on the disabled we 
interviewed, making statements on the differences between regions should be done with precaution because missing 
data on disability are an important problem especially in the Brussels capital region.  
However, in recent times, an increase in the number of people with a disability can be observed. 
According to RIZIV data (National Institute for Health and Disability insurance) it concerned 4.3% 
of the population (15-64) in 2013 vis-a vis 2.9% in 2000. 
 
People with disability have significantly lower levels of education than people without. 
Experiencing discomfort is also related to the professional group one belongs to: unskilled blue 
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and white collar workers are by far the groups who are the most affected (Samoy, 2013b). Disability 
prevalence increases sharply with age, which is critical in view of population ageing (OECD, 2010). 
The expert further mentioned that reliable statistics on the heterogeneity within the group of disabled are hard 
to come by because subgroups overlap, which makes comparisons between them unreliable. We do know that there 
are important differences between mental and physical disabilities. The type of disabilities have 
evolved over time: between 1995 and 2008 the share of disabled with mental health problems 
increased, the disabled with muscular skeletal problems remained approximately the same and the 
category of ‘other’ decreased (OECD, 2010, p. 62). Employment rates of people with mental health 
conditions are lower than those of people with muscular-skeletal conditions (OECD, 2010, p. 53). 
Figure 2.3 New disability benefit claims by health condition as a percentage of all claims, by age group, 
1995 (black diamonds) and 2008 (bars) in Belgium 
Source Data supplied by national authorities in OECD, 2010, p. 62 
2.2.2 Why are they vulnerable? 
- A first reason for the vulnerability of disabled people on the labour market is productivity 
loss due to a disability. These vary according to the type and the degree of disability. 
- Furthermore there are institutional reasons: 
o Firstly, employment policies for the disabled are a mix of policy measures
belonging to the competency of the federal state (e.g. anti-discrimination law, 
quotas for federal civil servants, disability benefits), the regions (e.g. special 
placement agencies, wage subsidies) or the communities (e.g. vocational training, 
sheltered work) (Department WSE, 2013). This complex and fragmented 
institutional setup can complicate taking effective measures.  
o Secondly, both Flanders and the Federal government grant wage subsidies for a
wide variety of ‘competing’ categories of disadvantaged workers, possibly 
overlapping with the category of disabled people. This leads to a complex tangle 
of allowed or prohibited combinations which is not always resolved in present 
regulations (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). The complexity can reduce the incentives 
for employers for hiring disabled workers.  
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- In addition there is a panacea of benefit schemes for the disabled. The schemes make 
them subject to other rules and measures5 and contain ‘activation’ elements (benefits may 
for instance be extended to people undergoing vocational training or combined with 
income from work) which are not all equally activating. Insured employees on a private 
sector contract becoming incapacitated for work, may claim a sickness benefit for a period 
of up to one year. Thereafter they may go on invalidity benefit. The eligibility criteria 
include a loss of earnings capacity of 66% over a period of at least 12 months and a 
minimum contribution of 120 days of actual work (Jousten et al., 2010). Incentives to 
return to work are limited as recipients are initially classified as fully disabled and thus 
without work capacity. Subsequently, recipients may return to (part-time) work if their 
work capacity is reduced by at least 50%, but benefits are reduced in line with rising wage 
income, entailing a high effective marginal tax rate (Hoj, 2013, p. 30). Persons that are not 
covered by this scheme are entitled to a disability allowance for which a medical assessment 
determines eligibility. There are special schemes for people who become incapacitated due 
to an occupational accident or disease. They receive compensation for the damage but, 
contrary to the recipients of the benefits mentioned earlier, they are not obliged to stop 
working. Incapacitated public sector employees from all levels and from the education 
sector are entitled to retire and receive an early pension. A small number of people is on 
unemployment benefits, typically people with a mental health disorder (OECD, 2013d) and 
some recipients of the residual welfare benefit (‘living wages’) are partially incapacitated for 
work. The interviewed government expert pleads for a better combination of benefits and 
(income from) employment, now only some benefit-systems are appropriate to combine 
part-time work with a benefit.  
It is important to take notice that the Belgian long term unemployed contain a residual 
group of persons who in other countries would fall under disability insurance schemes. For 
Flanders it has been empirically determined that this group is ‘hard-to-employ or not 
(yet) placeable’ because they have not been active for a considerable time and because 
they face several disparate obstacles to finding work (work-related and other obstacles, like 
psychosocial or medical problems) (Struyven, Heylen & Van Hemel, 2010). This research 
indicated that for 11.8% of all job-seekers, the problems are such that a return to work, 
even in the social economy, is not feasible within a reasonable time-period. In the past this 
led to calls to exempt those who were hard to place from any activation requirement, as 
these factors were believed no longer to be susceptible to influence once a person had been 
unemployed for a long time (cf. Bollens & Heylen, 2010). The fact that there is limited or 
no policy in place for this group, may explain their vulnerable labour market position 
further. 
 
- As regards employment and job retention for disabled people, Belgium (and especially 
Flanders) always had a preference for voluntary measures (such as wage subsidies) over 
statutory obligations (Binamé, 2004; Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). Only the federal 
administration has to meet a quota of 3% disabled people among the workforce and is 
obliged to provide reasonable accommodation for recruitment and the workplace. Overall 
compliance is low (Samoy, 2013). ALMP’s for the disabled are operated by dedicated 
institutions in Wallonia and Brussels. In Flanders these were mainstreamed in 2006 in the 
Flemish PES that administers and finances the interventions, but service delivery is mainly 
in the hands of private non-profit organisations, such as special job placement services and 
5 In explaining these schemes we draw heavily on the documents provided by the Flemish Department of Work and Social Economy 
(Samoy, 2013). 
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special training centres. All the Belgian regions grant wage subsidies and workplace 
adaptations grants (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012).  
 
- A further issue according to the interviewed disability expert is that our system is based on a 
deficit approach while we should go towards a capabilities approach. Employers can put the talents of 
the disabled to their benefit, e.g. people with autism or blind people who can feel imperfections in the coating 
of cars that even a computer can’t detect. 
 
- A last issue brought to the fore by this expert is that the transitions from the social economy 
(which employs many disabled) to the regular economy is hard for people with a disability because the 
period of personal (on the job) coaching is not always long enough. 
 
2.3 Migrants 
2.3.1 Who are they? 
 
Between 1990 and 2011 between 50% and 60% of immigrants were other EU-nationals (Vause, 
2013). The other EU nationals are mainly immigrants from the neighboring countries; in 2011 
10.6% and 7.4% of immigrants had the French and Dutch nationality respectively (Vause, 2013). 
The non-EU nationals are a very diverse group but they are mainly immigrants from Morocco 
and Turkey (OECD, 2008). The population of Belgian and EU-14 origin is older than the 
population of other origin (FOD WASO & CGKR, 2013). Immigrants have relatively lower 
educational attainment than natives; about half of them are low-skilled, compared with less than 
one-third of natives (Hoj, 2013). There are differences between groups: there are relatively more 
low educated amongst non EU-nationals than amongst EU nationals, note that problems with 
diploma recognition might be an explanation for this difference (FOD WASO & CGKR, 2013). 
 
It is important when looking at (LFS) statistics based on nationality, to take into account that 
people with a non-Belgian nationality represent a narrower group of immigrants than in other 
countries (Hoj, 2013). Firstly, Belgium had a quite liberal naturalization policy in the period 2000-
2013 because naturalization was seen by the authorities as a factor contributing to integration. In 
2013 the policy changed and it became more difficult to obtain the Belgian nationality. Secondly, 
one has to take into account the type of migration to Belgium: since the restriction of economic 
migration in the 1970s, migration was mainly family reunification often implying new arrivals with a 
further distance to the labour market (Hoj, 2013).  
 
In 2013 a report was published that for the first time coupled employment data with data on origin 
and migration background (for the year 2008), giving insight to the labour market situation of 2nd 
and 3rd generation migrants respectively (FOD WASO &CGKR, 2013). These data can give us a 
deeper insight than looking purely at nationality. In 2008 60.2% of the Belgian population between 
18 and 60 years old was of Belgian origin, which means that they were born as a Belgian and both 
their parents were born as a Belgian as well (FOD WASO & CGKR, 2013). There are important 
regional differences: in Brussels 25.5% of the population between 18 and 60 years old is of Belgian 
origin, in the Walloon region this is 56.9%, and in the Flemish region this is 68.3% (FOD WASO & 
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CGKR, 2013, p.27). This can be explained by the fact that Brussels is one of the main gateways for 
immigrants (CGKR, 2012). In all three regions the majority is of EU-14 and Maghreb6 origin.  
 
All the interviewees stressed that there is no such thing as ‘the’ migrants e.g. high educated migrants 
are a very specific group and there are large differences between EU and non-EU nationals. But 
even inside these groups there are large differences, especially according to sex. 
2.3.2 Why are they vulnerable? 
 
- First off immigrants might have a lack of language proficiency. This counts less for the 
other EU-nationals because a large part of them have the French and Dutch nationality 
(Vause, 2013) and they thus have a language advantage. Our interviewees at the Centre for 
Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CGKR) mentioned that the language 
requirements are very strict in Brussels. Indeed the knowledge of several (official) 
languages is more important to secure a job in Brussels and the German speaking 
community than in other regions (CGKR, 2012; HRW, 2013, p12).  
 
- Several of our interviewees mentioned the educational system as a problem: differences 
in educational outcomes between the second generation and natives are higher than in 
other countries (OECD, 2008). The OECD diagnoses the overcoming of the disadvantage 
of family background and any additional disadvantage associated with immigrant 
background (e.g. language problems) as an important challenge, particularly in Flanders. 
For immigrants the recognition of diplomas, even leads to a dequalification 
phenomenom (CGKR, 2012). 
 
- Because immigrants are overrepresented among those with a low education, the high 
labour cost in Belgium which adversely affects employment prospects for this group 
(especially because of the interaction with the EPL) will have a stronger effect in the 
aggregate on immigrants (OECD, 2008). 
 
- The OECD (2008) is concerned with the low labour market attachment of immigrant 
women and links this to unemployment/ inactivity traps. Disincentives in the tax and 
benefit system result in high net replacement rates for couples with second earners and low 
income. Foreign-born women tend to have relatively low expected wages and are thus 
affected by these traps.  
 
- A reason mentioned by all the interviewees is discrimination. Because the labour market 
position of immigrants is so much worse than in other countries, the question arises if 
there is more discrimination in Belgium. There are no indications for Belgian employers to 
refuse foreign born employees more because of racist reasons (FOD WASO, CGKR, 
2013). But if discrimination is seen as the result of a recruiting and selection process where 
immigrants, disabled or younger and older workers get less opportunities there are 
indications that Belgian employers discriminate more (Ibid). The EC’s Eurobarometer 
survey of discrimination conducted in 2012 reveals that, in Belgium, if a firm wants to 
recruit someone and has a choice between two candidates with the same skills and 
qualifications, the main criterion against a candidate, according to the responses (N = 1059 
6 Algeria, Libya, Morokko, Tunisia en Mauritania 
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in Belgium), is skin colour or ethnic origin: this factor is cited by 60 % of respondents, 
compared to an average of 39 % in the EU. (De Keyser, Delhez & Zimmer, 2012, p.38). 
 
- Less developed personal networks and information asymmetries are alternative 
explanations (OECD, 2008). Our interviewee at the labour union observes that the way in 
which the government tries to tackle discrimination, by means of raising awareness and the promotion of 
diversity management in companies, is not enforceable enough. He concludes that this observation counts 
for measures to promote employment of vulnerable groups in general. Often we use the stick for the 
unemployed, while we the carrot is for the others (often the employers). 
 
- A lack of targeted and coordinated policy is put forward by several interviewees. Hoj 
(2013, p. 23) states that the successful integration of migrants is complicated by 
immigration policy being a federal responsibility, labour market integration a regional 
responsibility, and integration and education policies community responsibilities. Some 
interviewees mention that labour market policy directed at migrants would be less 
favourable electoral but that migrants are reached by policies concerning the low educated. 
The Council of the EU recommends an encompassing strategy specifically aimed at 
immigrants even though the measures aimed at low-skilled youth are likely to also benefit 
them (Council of the EU, 2013). Our interviewees at the Centre for Equal Opportunities 
and Opposition to Racism (CGKR) point out that it could be stigmatizing to focus on migrants in 
labour market policy. They think policy should focus on discrimination and they nuance the lack of policy 
by pointing out that the PESs do have special guidance programmes for migrants. They further point out 
that in Flanders and Brussels there has been a diversity policy for a long time, while Wallonia has paid 
little attention to diversity. These kind of policies focus on pro-active measures to overcome 
discrimination, augment employers’ training offers to disadvantaged groups and to 
diversify recruitment channels (OECD, 2008). The interviewees continue that it is not known 
whether this diversity policy works. For certain companies, having a diversity plan might be windowdressing 
and it is possible that the companies that should be reached by this kind of policy, are not.  
 
2.4 Youth 
2.4.1 Who are they? 
 
As education is compulsory until the age of 18 in Belgium, the INSPIRES definition of youth as 
the 15-24 year olds can result in a biased view on the labour market position of Belgian youth. All 
of the interviewees agree that there is no such thing as ‘the’ youth and that low qualified youth are 
the most vulnerable. A large part of the Belgian youth starts higher education. In 2012, 43.9% of 
the 30-34 year olds enjoyed higher education (LFS data). In this same year 25.3% of Belgian youth, 
18-24 year olds, left school unqualified (LFS data). For this indicator there are notable regional 
differences: in Flanders it amounts to 28.1%, while in Wallonia and Brussels the rates are 22.9% 
and 17.5% respectively. 12.3% of young people (15-24) declared in the 2012 LFS that they are 
neither employed nor in education and training (NEET). There are however large regional 
differences: In Flanders 9.2% of youth is NEET, in the Walloon region 15.4% and in Brussels 
capital region 19.2%. 
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2.4.2 Why are they vulnerable? 
- The extent to which young people are vulnerable, is under discussion. In European 
perspective Belgian youth does not hold such a bad labour market position but with regard 
to the unemployment rate this can partially be explained by the fact that education is 
compulsory until the age of 18 (Plasman, 2010).  
- Wage costs were mentioned by several interviewees, especially for low educated youth. 
According to Cockx (2013, who cites Cahuc et al., 2013, p. 9) the cost of employing a 
twenty year old was in Belgium in 2010 among the highest in the OECD countries that 
have a minimum wage. The abolition by 2015 of the phase-in for minimum wage by age 
(currently the reduced rate is 70% for those aged less than 17, gradually increasing to 100% 
at age 21) is therefore worrying. Cockx further argues that the high minimum wage affects 
mainly the employment of lower educated youth, while the strict EPL mainly affects the 
employment of higher educated youth. He observes that the strict EPL for white collar 
workers decreases the speed of the school-to-work transition mainly for high-skilled youth 
(to the extent that white collar workers are more educated than blue collar workers). But 
this observation may not hold anymore in the future because the level of strictness will 
converge between white and blue collar workers. 
- An interviewed labour market researcher indicated the LIFO-principle (last in, first out) 
as one of the explanations for the vulnerability of young people on the labour market. In 
conjunction with this, the National Bank of Belgium (2011, p.59 and 2012, p. 142) 
mentions that their links with employers are more tenuous than those of more experienced 
workers who have been able to build up specific human capital, and for whom the cost of 
redundancy (depending on seniority) is higher if they have a permanent contract.  
- Several interviewees mentioned that young people tend to work more in temporary and 
tempagency jobs. The EC (2012, p. 60) links these non-standard jobs (part-time, 
temporary or casual and self-employed) to risks like low pay, job volatility, (repeated) 
unemployment and reduced chances to get further education or training. According to an 
expert of an NGO defending the rights of children and youth (further referred to as youth 
expert) we must link this to the transition from Fordist employment to post-Fordist 
employment and we must pay more attention to low-skilled young people. With the 
necessary nuances according to study field, high educated young people move relatively 
faster into the primary labour market. The experts of the Federal Public Service 
Employment Labour and Social Dialogue (FOD WASO) add to this that the Belgian problem 
of job-job mobility is not of such major concern for young people but this mobility mainly takes place in the 
secondary labour market, in sectors like the catering industry, trade or tempagency work. It is hard for 
young people to move up to other more productive sectors, especially the sectors that we consider as the 
locomotive of our economy like the chemical sector. 
- As the low educated youth are regarded the most vulnerable, all the interviewees stress 
that it is very important to reduce early school leaving. In addition, the mismatch 
between education and the labour market is often mentioned. The OECD (2007) 
confirms that the transition from school to work can be quite abrupt in Belgium and that 
coordinating policies to secure a smoother transition is difficult because of the division of 
competences between the Federal, regional and community level. Cockx (2013) mentions 
the strict separation between school and work, the vertically segmented schooling system 
with high retention rates and too early tracking as causal factors for the high 
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unemployment rates among young people. According to the youth expert, the Belgian and 
Flemish education scores particularly well in terms of science and mathematics. But besides that, education 
should focus as well on preparing youth for participation in society, and thus on participation on the labour 
market. A large part of schoolgoing youth does not know about wage structure, are alien to entrepreneurial 
logic, how social dialogue takes place, etc. They do not know what their rights and duties are, what kind of 
skills are required on the labour market, what their own capabilities and limitations are, etc. Many young 
people leave school without any qualification. But also, many young people – both with and without 
qualification - leave secondary education with “injuries”. These “injuries” have a negative effect on trust 
related matters such as confidence in the environment, institutions, teachers, themselves. Negative experiences 
can easily accumulate and reproduce themselves in any further contact with institutions, such as PES 
guidance, employers, etc. The PES, for example, is often still perceived as a punitive and controlling 
institution.  
 
2.5 Older workers 
2.5.1 Who are they? 
 
The INSPIRES definition for older workers starts at 55, but for Belgium it can be relevant to take 
into account the 50-55 year olds as well, as the figure below illustrates. Furthermore, there is no 
uniformity in the age threshold for ‘older workers’ in federal and regional legislation and subsidies 
e.g. some federal subsidies are targeted at the 45+ while Flanders has a subsidy that targets the 50+ 
(Gerard et al.,2013). 
 
Figure 2.4 Belgian employment rates (as a percentage of the population) are age dependent 
 
² A ranking was used to identify groups of OECD countries according to employment rates by age bracket 
Source OECD, 2013a, p. 26 
 
There is a lot of heterogeneity within the group of older workers according to a Flemish 
government expert on this group. According to her, characteristics of importance are the state of health and 
the type of labour (e.g. heavy physical work). The educational level is of less importance than the experience level and 
competencies. The interviewed labour market researcher remarks that education is often associated with 
regards to the age at which older workers leave the labour market. Higher educated workers stay active longer than 
the low educated. A possible explanation put forward by the interviewee is that the low educated do more physical 
work, and that there is less investment in LLL for/by them.  
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The Flemish government expert tells us that what characterizes this group is the low in- and outflow in 
unemployment. The lack of dynamism on the inflow side is due to a risk of dismissal: older workers have relatively 
stable jobs and they are targeted less than temporary workers, of which the majority are young people. But as soon as 
they (the older workers) become unemployed, their labour market situation is less favorable and finding a new job is 
difficult. Consequently, the long-term unemployment is high among elderly aged 50+. “Once unemployed or inactive 
over 55 years, always unemployed or inactive” seems to be the adage for the Belgian labour market, according to one 
of the interviewees of the Federal Public Service Employment Labour Social Dialogue (Van Thuyne, 2013). This 
figure below illustrates this with figures for the 55-64 year olds on the Belgian labour market between 2010 and 
2011.  
Figure 2.5 Labour market mobility of older workers 
 
 
Source Van Thuyne, 2013 
 
2.5.2 Why are they vulnerable? 
 
- All interviewees mentioned wage costs as an important reason for the vulnerability of 
older workers. As a result of the existing wage structure, based on seniority (formerly age), 
the wage rate of older workers is generally higher than that of younger colleagues. But the 
link between wages and age is primarily a phenomenon of white collar workers; for blue 
collar workers this link is relatively limited over the whole career (Van Thuyne, 2013). 
 
 Increasing wages according to the seniority principle would not prove to be problematic as 
long as they coincide with a parallel increase in the (perceived) productivity. But that 
perception is exactly where the problem often lies. As mentioned on the blog of the FOD 
WASO (Van Thuyne, 2013), certain prejudices of employers towards older workers e.g. 
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on productivity, flexibility, ICT skills, absences due to illness, etc. may be the reason for the 
lack of employment opportunities for unemployed and inactive elderly. According to our 
interviewees at the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (GKR) age is 
more important as a base for discrimination than origin; discrimination even starts from the age of 45 
(see Capéau, Eeman, Groenez & Lamberts, 2012).  
 
- A lack of investment in LLL (by employers and employees) is another reason that has 
been put forward during the interviews. The EC (2012, p. 65) confirms that older workers 
participate less in training than younger workers and generous early retirement schemes 
discourage older workers from taking part in training, whereas flexible early retirement 
schemes encourage such training. The interviewees of the FOD WASO associate this with 
the limited job-job mobility on the labour market.  
 
- The activity rate is rather low because of a culture of early retirement according to 
several of our interviewees. According to the interviewed labour market researcher this 
culture was created during the crisis years in the 1980’s when older workers were stimulated to make room 
for younger people on the labour market. They were exempted from jobsearch obligations, pré-pension 
possibilities were created, etc.  This led to an expectation pattern among older workers of leaving the labour 
market early. In recent years the culture is changing step by step (e.g. the intergenerational solidarity pact of 
2005) and measures were taken to keep older workers longer on the labour market (e.g. timecredit). But 
“seniority thinking” and well-meant measures like the obligation for employers to contribute to financing 
outplacement guidance create new risks for employers to employ older workers. 
 
- On the blog of the FOD WASO (Van Thuyne, 2013), we found a few other reasons for 
the lack of employment opportunities for unemployed and inactive elderly: 
- Recruitment policies which are still too much based on qualifications rather than 
experience (in conjunction with a still incomplete system of formal recognition of 
acquired skills). 
- The lack of willingness of employers to adapt work organisations to the age-related 
evolvement of capabilities of employees. 
- The lack of support from the PES in their search for work  (which is gradually 
changing, especially in Flanders, where from 2009 onwards a specific job guidance 
approach for jobseekers 50+ is in place).  
 
2.6 The low qualified 
2.6.1 Who are they? 
 
In 2011, 31.9% of the population, 15-64 years of age, had a diploma of lower secondary education 
at the most, versus 29.8% in the EU (HRW, 2013, p. 104). The group of low educated is 
proportionally bigger in Brussels and Wallonia (roughly 36%) than in Flanders (29%) (Ibid). The 
low educated are a heterogeneous group. According to the High Council of Employment (HRW, 
2013, p 13) this group comprises of more women than men and immigrants, especially the non 
EU-nationals are strongly represented. The disabled are not to be neglected: based on the 2002 
ad hoc module of the EAK the HRW deciphered that 58% of the disabled (or people with a long 
standing illness) was low educated as opposed to 41% of the total population (HRW, 2013, p. 18).  
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Age is an important determinant according to the HRW (2013). Adults without qualifications make 
up the largest part of the low educated. But an analysis of the High Council of Employment shows 
that amongst cohorts of older workers a large part of the low educated work, in a middle or high 
qualified job. For older workers the educational level is less important because they acquired certain 
competences and experience during their career. For young people the large part that is still 
studying has to be taken into account (ibid). 
2.6.2 Why are they vulnerable? 
- The vulnerability of lower educated can be explained by low demand for these type 
of workers and geographical mismatches (e.g. in Brussels most of the unemployed 
are low educated while most of the jobs require higher educated profiles) combined 
with low geographical mobility or commuting (see Zimmer, 2012). In 2012 80% of 
the jobs that were filled in, required middle and higher educated workers while 80% of 
the labour reserve consists of middle and lower educated persons (Zimmer, 2012). This 
makes the employment of lower educated more sensitive to the business cycle. They 
are the first to feel the impact of fluctuations and are more severely affected because 
they are easier to replace than higher educated personnel with specific knowledge and 
skills (NBB, 2010, p.54).  
- According to the labour market researcher the proportion of the ‘low educated’ decreased since 
the 1980’s but they became more vulnerable. The number of jobs for low educated went 
down because of (among others) delocalization, import from low wage countries and skill biased 
technological change which leads to job polarization. This is why it is so important to decrease 
unqualified school leaving and work on the recognition of competencies, of course the latter is only 
remediating. The National Bank (NBB, 2012, p. 133) explains this decline of industry by 
a more or less permanent process of restructuring and ever fiercer foreign competition. 
Between 2000 and 2012 hourly productivity in industry rose by 25 %, while 
employment declined by 17 %. Moreover, this decrease is attributable partly to 
developments such as outsourcing of non-core tasks and greater use of agency 
workers; these developments do not imply net job losses, but a reclassification in other 
branches of activity, particularly the business services sector (Ibid).  
- According to some of our interviewees there is a diploma culture on the labour 
market. This makes unqualified school leavers especially vulnerable. Other interviewees 
nuance this by pointing out that the diploma is mainly of importance for government 
employment, but then again a diploma stays an important indication of skills and 
competences for every employer. All of the interviewees agree that unqualified school 
leaving should be fought and some put forward modularization of the schooling 
system with attestation for every module as part of the solution. 
- It is important to notice that the schooling system is quite deterministic. This does 
not leave the labour market integration unaffected. According to the High Council of 
Employment (HRW) nearly two-thirds of the low educated young people have parents 
who have not completed secondary education, a fourth of them are medium educated 
parents, and only a minority has parents with a diploma of higher education (HRW, 
2013, pp. 104-105). 
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- According to the NBB experts wage costs are of great importance on the demand side because 
the low educated have little other comparative advantages. According to Cockx (2013) the low 
qualified are affected by the very high minimum wage level in Belgium since it raises 
the wage costs above the productivity, making it thereby unprofitable for employers to 
hire this group. When looking at the supply side our interviewees at the NBB state that 
the influence of social protection on the decision to be active on the labour market is an important factor 
for the position of the low educated on the Belgian labour market. In a report of the High 
Council for Employment (HRW, 2013, p .177) we found the revealing figure of a 90% 
unemployment trap in 2011 for a single low wage earner (67% of the average wage) 
without children.  
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3 |  The pre-crisis labour market position of 
vulnerable groups (2000-2008)  
3.1 The position of the disabled on the labour market 
The most reliable trend statistics for disabled to look at are the employment rates in the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), according to the interviewed Flemish government disability expert. He 
continues that the regional PESs keep track of disability among job-seekers but that data are not always reliable 
and that there are large differences from survey data. In addition the disabled who are registered with the PES make 
up only a fraction of the disabled who are spread out among different benefit systems. To look at evolutions we 
have to resort to partial data. Data on disability are available for the years 2002, 2007 (only Flanders 
and only the second quarter), and yearly as of 2009. 
Figure 3.1 Employment rate of people experiencing hindrance (Flemish region, 20-64 year olds unless 
mentioned otherwise) 
* LFS 2002: Do you have a disability or do you suffer from a long-standing health problem? Yes- No.
LFS 2007-2009-2010-2011: Do you experience in your daily activities (at work or elsewhere) hindrances due
to a disability, a long-term condition or illness (whether or not work-related)
Yes, a lot. Yes, to some degree. No.
Source Samoy, 2013b 
Due to differences in questioning between the 2002 and 2007 LFS, figures should be compared 
with some caution. Samoy (2013b, p.40) looks at the difference in the employment rate of disabled 
people (this is another statistic than shown in the figure above) and that of the general population. 
The gap in 2002 was 26.1 percentage points (65.8% vis a vis 37.4%) and 23.6% ppts in 2007 (65.8% 
vis a vis 42.2%). The employment rate of people with disabilities or long-term health problems 
increased. This partly follows the general increase in employment rate, but the figures show an 
additional increase of 2.5 ppts. In absolute numbers this translates to approximately 20 000 people 
with a disability or long-term health problems more at work in the period 2002-2007 (on average 
4000 more per year). 
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By contrast, when looking at data for Belgium as a whole the relative employment rate 
(employment rate of people with a disability versus that of people without a disability) went down 
between 1995 (ECHP) and 2007 (EU-SILC) from roughly 0.6 to 0.5 (Hoj, 2013). 
 
A 2003 law (revised in 2007) bans discrimination in hiring and in many other aspects of labour 
relations on the grounds of a disability or health. This includes failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation. This type of policy removes barriers for disabled people wanting to find work or 
to remain in work. 
 
In 2006, Flanders mainstreamed active labour market policies for the disabled into the 
regular public employment services (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). According to the government 
disability expert the integration of the Flemish Fund (responsible for disability employment policy) in the Flemish 
PES meant an important boost for disability policies. This led to expanding the services of GTB, Special Pathways 
to work and Guidance Service, who are assisted by the GA, assessment centres, and ensured that the attention for 
disabled within the PES trickled down to consultants and up to the management. This resulted in more people put 
into action for specialized employment guidance within the Flemish PES. In Wallonia and Brussels disability policies 
are relatively less pursued. 
 
Belgium is in OECD context amongst those countries with a slightly increasing disability recipiency rate, 
from roughly 4.5% to 6% between 1990 and 2008 (OECD, 2010b). The number of people on invalidity benefit 
has been rising steadily over the years, albeit not as fast as in the Netherlands and the UK (Velche, 2006) and stood 
at 265 000 at the end of 2009; expenditures reached nearly 3000 million euros, or about 11 000 euros per head. 
Not until the quickening pace caused alarm in recent years (+12% in two and a half years in Flanders), ‘activation’ 
of recipients never was an issue (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). 
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3.2 The position of migrants on the labour market  
 
Figure 3.2 Employment rate by nationality (15-64 year olds) 
 
* Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Figure 3.3 Unemployment rate by nationality (15-64 year olds) 
 
* Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27, in 2011 the phrasing of the questions in the LFS 
changed 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
Between 2000 and 2008 other EU-country nationals and especially non-EU nationals were catching 
up with Belgian nationals with respect to the employment rate. The employment rate of the non-
EU nationals went up from 33.29% to 39.85% and the gap with Belgians decreased from 28.42 
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ppts to 23.27 ppts. For other EU-country nationals the gap decreased from 3.41 ppts in 2000 to 
0.72 ppts in 2008 (own computations, based on data in appendix). 
 
The unemployment rate for other EU-nationals roughly follows the rate of Belgian nationals on a 
slightly higher level, while the rate for non-EU national is much higher and shows much larger 
fluctuations. As of 2005 the gap between the unemployment rates of immigrants and Belgians 
decreased, especially for non-EU immigrants. In 2000 the gap for other EU-country nationals was 
3.82 ppts while it was 23.52 ppts for non-EU nationals, these decreased to 2.81 ppts and 21.06 ppts 
in 2008 respectively (own computations, based on data in appendix).  
 
Belgium does not perform well in a European perspective regarding the labour market outcomes of 
immigrants from outside the EU (Hoj, 2013). Differences in employment rates between second 
generation migrants and natives are also higher than in other OECD countries (OECD, 2008). 
 
Research (a.o. OECD, 2008 and FOD WASO & CGKR, 2013) shows that having the Belgian 
nationality has a positive impact on labour market results (higher wages, type of employment, 
employment probability etc.). According to the OECD (2008) the positive impact of holding the 
Belgian nationality holds even after controlling for a large range of socio-economic characteristics, 
including age, country-of-origin, educational attainment, region and duration of residence. 
Controlling for positive self-selection is hard so the question remains what is cause and what is 
effect.  
3.3 The position of youth on the labour market  
Figure 3.4 Employment rate youth(15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions (2000-2012) (%) 
 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
The employment rate of young people aged between 15 and 24 years has fallen between 2000 and 
2003, from 29.04% to 27.36% and remained stable until 2008 around 27%. The Flemish 
employment rate is higher than the Walloon and Brussels employment rate. The reason that 
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employment for this group is low is because at this age many young people are still studying (more 
than in other countries since there is compulsory schooling untill the age of 18) and are therefore 
inactive on the labour market. When looking at the employment rate for the same age group, 
excluding students, we notice that in 2007 and 2008 it fluctuated around 70% (earlier data not 
available). 
Figure 3.5 Employment rate youth excl. students (15-24 year olds) in Belgium and its regions (2007-2012) 
(%) 
 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Figure 3.6 Unemployment rate youth (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions (2000-2012) (%) 
 
* In 2011 the phrasing of the questions in the LFS changed 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Between 2000 and 2003 youth unemployment rate increased from 17.55% to 21.74%, to decrease 
again until 2008 to the level of 17.97%. Regarding unemployment, there are large regional 
differences. The statistics show that youth unemployment is more of a problem in Wallonia and 
Brussels, but not so much in Flanders. Looking at the ratio between the youth unemployment rate 
(under 25 years) and prime aged adult (25-54 years) unemployment rate, Cockx (2013) states that 
youth unemployment is an important problem in Flanders as well. The ratio based on the Eurostat 
10 year’s average (2003-2012) is 3.3 in Flanders, 3.1 in Wallonia and 2.2 in Brussels (Cockx, 2013, p. 
3). Cockx points out that this high ratio is predominantly a problem of low educated youth since 
the high educated are often still studying at young age while the low educated already entered the 
labour market. The interviewees at the NBB note that caution is required when comparing these ratios 
because the proportion of young people continuing studies at a higher level, and also the composition of the age group 
25-54 years old, can vary across regions. Moreover it is risky too only look at unemployment figures as these do not 
take into account the inactive share of people in the population.  
Figure 3.7 NEET-youth rate** of 15-24 year olds Not in Employment, Education or Training, in Belgium and 
its regions (2000-2012) (%) 
 
* Break in the data ** The share of youth in the age group of 15 to 24 year olds that is not in employment, 
education or training 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
A group that is particularly worrisome is the group of youth that is not in education, employment 
or training (NEET). Between 2000 and 2008 the youth NEET-rate went down considerably from 
17.70% to 10.10% (6.6 ppts). When looking at these statistics it is important to take notice of the 
fact that young people in Belgium have a particular incentive to sign on with the PES when leaving 
school because they are entitled to unemployment benefits after a certain period of time, regardless 
of the number of days they have worked.  
 
The OECD (2010c) observes that ALMPs in Belgium have gradually become more focused on 
young job-seekers. In 2004 the Federal State, the regions and communities signed a cooperation 
agreement that revised the unemployment insurance scheme. The National Employment Office 
(RVA) and regional PESs jointly monitor the job search efforts of benefit claimants. Young (under 
30) jobseekers were the first to be activated under this agreement. According to Van Parys, Van 
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Dooren & Struyven (2013) this coercive activation policy went hand in hand with an enabling 
activation policy particularly in Flanders. At the end of 2007 the Flemish government and PES 
established the Youth Work Plan, a ‘comprehensive approach’ for young people that involved a 
‘work first’ approach. Mid-2007, the Walloon PES also introduced a programme with intensive 
tailored guidance and counselling for young jobseekers during the first six months after leaving 
school: the Job Tonic programme (OECD, 2010b). The 2005 pact on solidarity between 
generations extended existing measures for young people, with greater emphasis on young people 
with very few skills, unskilled young people of foreign origin and unskilled young people with 
disabilities (OECD, 2007). 
3.4 The position of elderly workers on the labour market  
 
The Belgian activity rate of older workers is low and is more than 10% below the European 
average. However, one can observe an increasing trend in recent times: between 2000 and 2008, the 
activity rate rose from 26.80% to 36.10%. 
Figure 3.8 Activity rate of older workers in EU-27, Belgium and its regions (55-64 years old), 2000-2012 
 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
The employment rate went up from 26.13% in 2000 to 34.51% in 2008 (8.39 ppts). There is an 
increasing trend of part-time work: in 2003, 9.07% of the older people (50-64 year olds) was 
working part-time, while this rose to 13.46% in 2008 (see appendix). According to the interviewees 
a large part of the increase in the employment rate can be ascribed to higher female participation. 
The National Bank identifies other fundamental trends that contributed to the rise in the 
employment rate: the improvement in the level of education and the tertiarisation of the economy 
(NBB, 2012, pp140-141). According to the High Council of Employment when looking at age and 
educational levels, we notice that the employment rate of elderly rose overall, regardless of their 
educational level, but the increase turns out to be higher as elderly are higher educated (HRW, 
2013, p. 50).  The unemployment rate of older people is low, but shows an increasing trend: it went 
from 3% in 2000 to 4.36% in 2008. 
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Figure 3.9 Employment rate of older workers (55-64 years old), Belgium and its regions 2000-2012 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Figure 3.10 Unemployment rate of older workers (55-64 years old), Belgium and its regions 2000-2012 
 
* In 2011 the phrasing of the questions in the LFS changed 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
With respect to the elderly, there are few distinct regional differences except for Brussels. Brussels 
is doing better than other regions in terms of activity rate and the employment rate. A plausible 
explanation is the type of employment in the region, including a large share of knowledge jobs 
where people typically remain active until a later age. With respect to unemployment figures, 
Brussels performs worse, but the figures require some caution, since they are only available from 
2008 onwards. According to our interviewees at the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), regional 
differences could be a consequence of the age until which job search efforts are followed-up and enforced, which differ 
between regions. 
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According to our interviewees at the Federal Public Service Employment Labour Social Dialogue 
(FOD WASO), Belgian measures in the 2000-2008 period, but also after the crisis, were mainly targeted at 
getting people to work longer. Examples are subsidies that encourage career breaks and the time credit system which 
are meant to make the combination between work and private life easier and for people to remain active up to an 
older age. There still is an important problem concerning the (re)hiring of older workers. Van Thuyne (2013) 
specifies this problem on the blog of the FOD WASO7. Firstly, our wage scales are strongly based 
on seniority (formerly age) which makes older workers more expensive, especially white collar 
workers. Secondly, employers risk bearing the cost of early retirement for the recruited older 
unemployed. These factors imply that the benefits of recruiting an older worker are 
disproportionate to the costs. 
The interviewed Flemish government expert on older workers confirms that it is very difficult for older 
workers to get out of unemployment. According to her the explanation does not only lay in high wage costs for older 
workers (cf. age/seniority based wage system) but also in prejudices about older workers, and institutional factors. 
Belgium had a passive employment policy for a long time.  
Figure 3.11 Composition of the group of older workers (50-64 years old) by socioeconomic position (2003-
2011, %) 
Source VDAB, RVA, NBB, FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie - LFS 
(bewerking Departement WSE/Steunpunt WSE) 
But policy is becoming more activating. The table above illustrates this with a decreasing share of 
older jobseekers (50-64 years old) registered with the PES that are exempt from job search 
obligations and fulltime pré-pension exempt from job search obligations. 
In 2005 the Federal authorities enacted a pact on solidarity between generations. This ‘Generation 
Pact’ aims to tackle the division between generations which favours adult access to stable 
employment and imposes on younger and older people, who are taken care of by the community, 
the main burden of labour market flexibility (OECD, 2007). The pact contains end-of-career 
7 Blog April 12 2013 (http://blog.werk.belgie.be/blog/arbeidsreglementering/hinderpalen-voor-de-aanwerving-van-oudere-
werknemers) 
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measures (e.g. access to pre-pensions was restricted for workers under the age of 60, and the 
minimum career length to gain access was raised to 35 years) and youth employment measures. 
3.5 The position of low qualified on the labour market  
 
The tables below clearly illustrate that the position of low educated on the Belgian labour market is 
more precarious than middle or high educated groups. The employment rate of the low educated 
hovered around 49% in the 2000-2008 period and the difference with the employment rate of other 
educational groups stayed quasi the same (roughly 24 ppts and 35 ppts compared to the middle and 
higher educated respectively). 
Figure 3.12 Employment rate (25-64 year olds) according to educational level, Belgium (%) 
 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
The unemployment rate of the low educated shows an increasing trend: it went from 8.47% in 2001 
to 10.84% in 2008. The difference with the higher educated increased from 7.12 ppts in 2000 to a 
maximum difference of 8.66 ppts in 2005, and then decreased again to 7.66 ppts (own 
computations, based on data in appendix). The majority of unemployed low qualified are men, 
while women are in the majority amongst the low qualified inactive (HRW, 2013, p 13-14). 
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Figure 3.13 Unemployment rate (25-64 year olds) according to educational level, Belgium (%) 
 
* In 2011 the phrasing of the questions in the LFS changed 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
The High Council of Employment concludes in its 2013 report on the low educated that the 
schooling level is a key factor with regard to stable employment: Compared to those holding higher 
education qualifications, the probability of a transition from employment to unemployment, is 
almost twice as high for medium educated and three times larger for the low educated (HRW, 2013, 
p. 126).  In addition the employment of low educated became less stable during the period 1998-
2011. They explain this by the overrepresentation of low educated in sectors that have been 
restructured, and the fact that the rise of tempagency work and temporary contracts amongst this 
group was quicker than amongst other educational groups (HRW, 2013, p. 14).  
 
Reforms to boost labour demand for low-educated have mostly aimed at reducing labour costs via 
targeted cuts in employers’ social security contribution (Hoj, 2013). There is also policy attention 
regarding valuing skills and competencies. There are regional procedures to certificate competencies 
and officially recognize professional knowledge and know-how acquired outside of typical training 
channels. 
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4 |  The Crisis 
 
4.1 General overview 
 
In general, Belgium is known as one of the European countries which dealt with the economic and 
financial crisis relatively well. After a first period of economic recession in 2008 and 2009, 
employment started to expand again between 2009 and 2011. This period of economic recovery 
was followed by a second dip in the second half of 2011 (Bulté & Struyven, 2013; Heylen et al., 
2013). The first crisis period 2008-2009, treated Belgium slightly less harshly than other European 
countries (De Mulder & Druant, 2011; 2012a). In terms of decrease in GDP, the second dip of the 
economy was not as sharp as the first one, but in terms of employment the second dip hit the job 
market relatively harder than in the first period. At the same time, the unemployment rate increased 
less than in most other European countries.  
 
According to Druant & De Mulder (2012,b), structural unemployment increased after the crisis but 
only to a limited extent. The recent increase in unemployment accompanied by an increase in the 
estimated structural unemployment figure, contrary to what occurred in the period 2001-2005, 
indicates that the increase in unemployment has become structural for a part and that, 
consequently, hysteresis effects might arise. 
 
Figure 4.1 The Belgian unemployment rate (2007-2012) 
 
Source OECD, 2013a 
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Figure 4.2 The crisis in Belgium in international context : trend in volume of GDP 
 
Source De Mulder & Druant, 2011, p. 89, EC, NAI. 
4.2 Some explanations  
 
The low increase in the unemployment rate is widely interpreted as a result of labour hoarding, in 
particular through the large use of short working time schemes (Hijzen and Venn, 2011; OECD, 
2013a). According to the OECD “the largest proportions of permanent jobs saved were in 
Belgium, Finland and Italy” (OECD Economic Outlook, 2010). Several factors have contributed to 
the relatively favourable reaction of the Belgian labour market, at least in the short term. A first 
factor concerns internal flexibility, employers reduced the number of working hours without 
redundancies. They made extensive use of schemes such as temporary or economic unemployment 
and reduction of working hours, both function as anti-crisis measures. 
 
The largest permanent scheme for blue-collar workers, the so-called economic or temporary 
unemployment, allows employers to suspend (partially or completely) wage contracts, i.e. stop 
remuneration but keep workers on the pay-roll (Hoj, 2013). A similar scheme for white-collar 
workers was introduced as an anti-crisis measure in 2009. A third temporary scheme was 
introduced in 2009 and expired in early-2011 to allow employers to reduce working time for all 
employees within a collective agreement at the firm level (so-called collective reductions) (Hoj, 
2013). 
 
Anti-crisis measures 
 
The anti-crisis law of 19 June 2009 provided for certain temporary anti-crisis measures to be taken by 
employers. The aim was to limit job losses resulting from the recession by increasing flexibility in the labour 
force. The law initiated three new measures: 
 
- Temporary and collective reduction of working time: The measure provides in a lowering of social 
security contributions in the case of a temporary and collective reduction of working time. When 
accompanied by the introduction of a four-day week, the reduction is higher (see policy innovations WP3). 
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- Crisis Time Credit System: When fulfilling certain criteria8, firms can make use of a system that 
enables individual and temporary reduction of work commitments. If an agreement exists between the 
worker and the employer to reduce working time by 1/5 or ½ for a period of minimum one month and at 
maximum 6 months the workers receives an amount depending on his age and the reduction of working 
time (see Policy Innovation WP3). 
- Temporary suspension of employees’ contracts of employment: When fulfilling certain criteria8, firms 
can make use of a system for temporary suspension of employees’ contracts, the workers receive a benefit 
equal to 70 or 75% of his or her salary limit for contributions from the National Employment Office and a 
matching amount of the employer (see Policy Innovation WP3). 
 
 
 START END 
Temporary and collective 
reduction of working time 
 
Introduced 1 July 2009 Till 31 January 2011 
Crisis Time Credit System Introduced 1 July 2009 
 
Till 31 January 2011 
 
Temporary suspension of 
employees contracts of 
employment 
 
Introduced 1 July 2009 Structural measure as of 1 
January 2012 
Crisis wage subsidy 1 January 2010 31 december 2011 
 
 
  
 
The measures made it possible for firms to respond more quickly to temporary work shortages for economic 
reasons. These different measures have been extended different times along the crisis period and some 
conditions applying to them have been relaxed. The two first two measures were stopped on 31 January 
2011. The third measure was specific for white collar workers whose contracts of employment did not allow 
them to be declared temporarily unemployed (unlike blue collar workers, for whom temporary 
unemployment already existed before and has been used as a large-scale measure during the crisis) and 
became structural policy in 2012. The measures have been supplemented by the implementation of a crisis 
wage subsidy, a bonus for blue collar workers whose employment contract was terminated between 1 
January 2010 and 31 December 2011.  
 
 
The anti-crisis measures were not without success. The take-up of reduced working time schemes 
nearly doubled between 2007 and 2009. With 5.6% of workers in one of these systems in 2009, 
Belgium comes first in Europe; Germany follows with 3.2% (Geurts, 2012). Following OECD 
estimates, in the case of Belgium short time working schemes may have damped the fall in 
permanent employment by as much as 1.3% by the autumn of 2009, relative to a scenario where 
such schemes would not have been available (OECD, 2010). This figure represents 0.9% of the 
employment rate. According to our interviewee at the labour union the success of these measures can 
firstly be explained by the fact that employers drew lessons from previous crises: they value their skilled workers and 
want to keep them. Secondly there is a “newfound self-esteem” amongst blue collar workers: they don’t take it 
anymore that they are the only ones who have to stay at home on economic unemployment schemes. So the burden is 
divided between blue and white collar workers. To explain the success of these policies, the National Bank 
of Belgium additionally points to the fact that firms were convinced that they would face structural 
shortages of skilled labour in the near future and were in a sound financial position when the crisis 
erupted (NBB, 2010, p. 43). 
 
A second explanation for the Belgian labour market response to the crisis is concerned with  
employers’ intensive use of temporary agency work to adapt rapidly to changes in demand. The 
8  The criteria are as follows: a firm has to prove it has been negatively affected by the crisis which resulted in a fall in turnover or a fall 
in production. The criterion is a 15% reduction in orders, turnover or production compared to the same period one year earlier. 
Besides, the firm has to have a collective agreement in place that allows for the measure to be implemented. 
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recession in 2008-2009 led to a sharp drop in temporary employment (-29 000 full-time 
equivalents), which immediately was followed by a strong recovery in 2009-2010 (+ 14 000 full-time 
equivalents). The extent to which the tempagency sector endured the recession was much greater 
than during the previous crisis in 2001 (Geurts, 2012). This is because tempagency jobs today 
represent a much more important part of employment than in the past (1.7% in 1995 compared to 
3.2% in 2011), but also because of the exceptional nature of the crisis, which struck above all 
sectors where many use is made of temporary agency work.  
A third explanation for the Belgian response deals with the restricted job creation which reflects a 
less dynamic labour market, which is less resilient against economic downturns. The Belgian 
labour market is less able to benefit from the cautious economic recovery, job creation remains at a 
lower level. As a result, job growth is very limited. The sectoral structure of the economy 
determines to a large extent the resilience of the economy and labour demand. A high proportion 
of industrial firms is characteristic of an economy with strong foundations, but which is also highly 
sensitive to cyclical fluctuations. Furthermore, Belgium’s enterprise sector does not perform well in 
terms of innovation. Conversely, while non-commercial services act as a buffer against cyclical 
fluctuations affecting labour demand, too high a proportion may have a stifling effect on the 
economy. The industrial sector in Belgium is a large sector characterized by fairly weak job 
dynamics. It has high start-up and expansion costs, limiting the effect of economic revival on job 
creation. Conversely, a cyclical downturn leads to increased job destruction, despite potential 
buffering instruments such as temporary unemployment or reduction in working hours. The 
sector’s response to the economic downturn in 2009 was clear: the job creation rate declined, while 
the job destruction rate increased sharply. In some subsectors, the negative job change was 
primarily caused by the recession, whereas in other subsectors, it reflected the structural decline of 
the industrial sector. In service sectors, start-up costs are lower and existing enterprises are generally 
younger and smaller, thus boosting employment dynamics. Part of the job losses in the industrial 
branches were compensated by job creation in the commercial sector. This sectoral shift was 
accompanied by a strong shift from full-time to part-time jobs (Geurts, 2012). The creation of part-
time jobs reflected a long-term trend of a declining volume of labour. 
As a fourth explanation for the Belgian response, during the first wave of the crisis there was still a 
considerable job growth in the public sector and in non-commercial services. A typical result 
of Belgian labour market policies is the rise of jobs in the social services sector, consisting of 
cleaning services for private households paid for by the service voucher scheme. This job creation 
scheme had a moderating influence on unemployment among low-skilled women. This also fits 
into a tradition of supply-driven policy. Recently, the public sector as well as the educational sector 
in the French speaking community, were affected by severe spending cuts. As a consequence, 
replacement of employees on retirement was delayed or drained. Particularly in healthcare and 
social services job creation was high, which compensated for job losses in the industrial and 
commercial sectors during the economic downturn. In recent years however, their compensating 
role as economy-stabilizing sectors is cancelled out. 
In sum, the Belgian economy has been resilient throughout the crisis with a smaller increase in 
unemployment than in many other OECD countries, which reflected widespread labour hoarding. 
Furthermore, more people were (temporarily) employed through the extensive use of temporary 
agency work. Third, the creation of part-time jobs reflected a long-term trend of a declining volume 
of labour. Besides the extensive use of short time working schemes, another factor that contributed 
to the declining volume of labour resulted from a sectoral shift in employment from the industrial 
towards the tertiary and quaternary sectors of economy. Besides time adjustment mechanisms, there 
has been a significant decrease in tempagency contracts during the crisis. 
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4.3 Automatic Stabilizers  
 
The initially favourable analysis of five years of crisis on the Belgian labour market to a certain 
extent hides deeper structural changes in the employment structure (especially due to  
deindustrialisation), which causes shocks to which labour market actors are barely prepared. 
According to employers’ advocates, the low degree of job creation is caused by the high labour 
costs and the strong employment protection of insiders on the labour market. A large number of 
labour market institutions have come under pressure: minimum wages (which are high by 
international standards), automatic wage indexation (along with Greece the only country in EU), 
wage-setting based on seniority instead of productivity (loss of cost competitiveness), employment 
protection (costly layoff procedures for white-collar workers), generous unemployment benefits, 
and a complicated tax-benefit system. These latter elements of fiscal policy are defined as automatic 
stabilizers which mitigate output fluctuations without discretionary government action (Dolls et al., 
2012). In particular in the recent economic crisis in Belgium, the workings of automatic stabilizers 
in the fiscal system are found to play a key role in providing income insurance for households and 
hence in stabilizing demand and output. Belgium is one of the countries within the EU for which 
the highest stabilization coefficients are found. 
 
However, the favourable working of automatic stabilizers – wage indexation mechanism, centrally 
negotiated wage formation, generous social security system and progressive tax system – also has its 
down side. The annual OECD report on the Belgian economy (2013) points out that there are 
many inbuilt factors which reduce the competitiveness of Belgium’s labour market. These include 
high taxes and the perverse effects automatic wage indexation has on salary growth9. The OECD 
recommends that this mechanism be phased out and that wage growth be more closely linked to 
performance. Encouraging labour hoarding is now called a high-risk practice for companies during 
a recession as it reduces profitability, although it guarantees that talent remains in the company.  
 
Interviewees at the NBB argue that employment in the public sector was an additional stabilizer. However, 
budgetary reasons limit the scope of this policy measure. Belgium has created employment by subsidizing jobs e.g. the 
system of service vouchers but on the long term such schemes are not sustainable without more economic activity. 
Growth figures are low, and consequently is job creation. Belgium deployed temporary unemployment as an element of 
flexibility, which is useful for short-term shocks. But we notice that employers continue using it, which is a barrier for 
growth because workers remain unavailable for the economy, even highly skilled and medium skilled profiles that are 
in demand by other employers. Thus, instead of increasing flexibility of the labour market it becomes an element of 
rigidity that increases the problem of mismatch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Systemic Reforms   
 
Besides the temporary measures, several structural measures were taken to improve the labour 
market position for both employed and unemployed. The crisis did not hamper taking on structural 
problems. Under the new federal government since 2011, fundamental reforms took place in the 
9 Belgium has some of the highest tax wedges among the OECD countries (Hoj, 2013).  
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retirement scheme (through post-ponement of early reteriment age), the degressivity of the 
unemployment benefits (which was strengthened), the reform of the waiting allowance for school 
leavers, and the uniform statute for blue and white collar workers (which entailed a number of 
changes in labour contract legislation). Reforms aimed in particular at increasing activity of both the 
young and older workers and reducing labour market traps. 
  
- Unemployment Benefit System Reform: The unemployment system was reformed to 
strengthen search incentives for unemployed workers. The reform includes greater 
degressivity in unemployment benefits, the tightening of the eligibility conditions for the 
integration allowance (formerly waiting allowance) for school-leavers and strengthening job 
search monitoring/ active job-seeking (see policy innovations WP 3). 
- Early retirement reform: By reforming the early retirement and pre-pension programmes 
(e.g.  by raising the admission age and career length requirements), Belgium aims to 
increase the internationally low effective retirement age and align it with the statutory 
retirement age (see policy innovations WP3). 
- Uniform statute for blue and white collar workers: The unified status harmonizes 
labour conditions for blue and white collar workers (new redundancy scheme, trial periods, 
outplacement, etc.)   
- Fiscal measures: measures to lower targeted payroll charges have similarly been decided 
for young people and older workers – specifically the target groups for which the 
employment rate is still very low   (e.g. Work Bonus)  
 
Policy Reactions  
 
During the expert interviews, some remarks were made concerning the type of policy measures and the 
timing of policies. These are as follows: 
 
- According to the FOD WASO experts the crisis was a momentum to create ‘targeted measures’ for youth 
and for short time working schemes. The latter have mostly benefited workers with permanent contracts, 
higher unemployment mostly affected workers with weaker labour market attachment due to labour 
market segmentation between insiders and outsiders (Hoj, 2013).  
 
-The FOD WASO experts and the Flemish Government expert on older workers think that the crisis was not 
really a momentum for reforms in the unemployment benefit system (like the degressivity and the stricter 
rules for school leavers) or retirement schemes but it did make it easier, especially in combination with the 
budgetary tightness.  
 
-The crisis further caused that the service vouchers were not questioned although they have a large price 
tag according to the FOD WASO experts. As mentioned before, the vouchers were an important mediating 
factor for the low educated (mainly women).  
 
-The FOD WASO experts observe that the crisis did not cause major breakages in policy but did affect ideas. 
Firstly the idea that employment of young and old can go together. Secondly consciousness of the 
importance of a better transition between education and employment was raised. European policies, such 
as the Youth Guarantee, stimulated this conscience.  
 
-The budgetary context played an important role for the type of measures chosen, according to the FOD 
WASO experts. Because of the budgetary tightness the budget could not be raised, so shifting funds means 
creating losers which is a politically sensitive matter. Therefore measures are chosen that give the biggest 
possible group something extra which results in a small marginal effect on employment. In this way the 
measures do not solve anything structurally about the economic situation. This is also the analysis of the 
interviewed youth expert. He believes the focus is too much on the framework enabling policies, e.g. labour 
costs, but this does not necessarily result in more jobs. To illustrate, he cites a metaphor of employers during 
the crisis of 1980’s: “If the horse is not thirsty, it will not drink.” His conclusion is that there is a macroeconomic 
problem of too little demand, while policies focus too much on measures affecting supply (cf. activation of 
unemployed) 
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5 |  The effect of the crisis on the vulnerable groups 
(2008-2013)  
 
 
According to our interviewees at the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue (FOD WASO) the groups that are vulnerable now are the same groups that were vulnerable in the 
period before the crisis. They do observe a striking difference between men and women before and after the crisis and 
state the crisis could be regarded as a good thing for gender equality. Our interviewees at the National Bank of 
Belgium (NBB) provided statistics (EC: LFS) on the Belgian employment rate evolutions for men 
and women for the first three quarters of 2013 w.r.t. the first three quarters of 2008: men lost 0.2 
ppts, while women gained 2.0 ppts. An explanation for this more adverse effect on men is that they 
often work in sectors that are more sensitive to the business cycle while women are strongly 
represented in the less sensitive service sectors (NBB, 2011). Apart from this sectorial explanation 
the rising employment rate of women is underpinned by cohort effects: the youngest groups in the 
female population are increasingly skilled, and those women are participating in working life to a 
greater extent and for longer periods (Ibid). These same cohort effects and the effects of the 
reforms in pension schemes are often quoted as an explanation for the increasing employment rate 
of older workers. De Mulder & Druant (2012b) also mention added worker-effects resulting from 
the negative income and wealth effects of the crisis. 
 
The impact of the crisis affected mostly the flexible (temporary) workers, businesses in 
restructuring and certain groups like young people and the low-educated (Dynam Press release, 
2013). Our analysis adds the non-EU migrants to the most affected groups. According to Mulder & 
Druant (2012b) labor market segmentation increases the correction of employment due to adverse 
shocks and it causes disproportionate pressures on the adaptation process for specific employee 
groups, such as the aforementioned. De Mulder & Druant add that the longer these groups are 
unemployed, the greater the risk that their skills will diminish, making it harder for them to find 
work in the future which can eventually  lead to higher structural unemployment. In conclusion, we 
should consider the same groups as vulnerable before and after the crisis, but the crisis has 
exacerbated their situation, exposing vulnerable groups even more. 
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5.1 The position of the disabled on the labour market  
5.1.1 Effects of the crisis 
 
According to the interviewed Flemish government disability expert we were doing well until the crisis 
came along. This is indicated by the employment rate, where the positive evolution between 2002 and 2007 was offset 
after 2007. 
Figure 5.1 Employment rates of people experiencing hindrance * (20-64 years old), Flanders (%) 
 
* LFS 2007-2009-2010-2011: Do you experience in your daily activities (at work or elsewhere) hindrances due 
to a disability, a long-term condition or illness (whether or not work-related) Yes, a lot. Yes, to some degree. 
No 
Source Samoy, 2013 and FOD Economie – AD Statistiek en Economische Informatie – LFS 2012 Bewerking : 
Department WSE. 
 
Between 2007 and 2010 a sharp decrease was observed in the employment rate of people who are 
hampered by a disability, a long term condition or illness in Flanders. This may be caused by a 
survey bias, but it is possible that some of the disabled people, discouraged by the economic crisis, 
withdrew themselves from the labour market. This is because after losing their jobs, disabled 
people generally flow out more often to inactivity than to unemployment (Boey, 2011, who cites 
Samoy, 2011). For the group that doesn’t experience hindrance, the decrease of the employment 
rate was much smaller, as of 2007 the disability gap in the Flemish employment rate increased. 
The employment rate amongst the Flemish disabled started rising again in 2011. The government 
disability expert thinks of the following explanations: a bigger budget for jobcreation; more people put into 
action for specialized employment guidance within the Flemish PES (because of the mainstreaming of ALMPs in the 
PES, see above); the Flemish Support Grant (see below); people with psychological problems, the ‘MMPP’ group, get 
more attention and specialised guidance; people on the Health and Disability Insurance are being activated. 
 
The disability expert continues that many social economy organizations (SEOs) perform activities (production, 
services) which are sub-contracted with ordinary firms, so the crisis hit the SEOs, especially the sheltered workshops, 
as well. The sheltered workshops employ many disabled people. In 2010, Flanders spent 220 
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million euros on wages for about 16 000 disabled employees in sheltered workshops (Samoy & 
Waterplas, 2012). 
 
According to the government disability expert the crisis also had a negative effect on the achievement of target 
figures or quota by the government. Because of the crisis and subsequent budget cuts, governments have 
almost stopped hiring. This combined with the fact that they mostly hire higher educated persons and the fact that a 
large proportion of the disabled are low-educated makes it difficult to achieve the quota. A solution, according to the 
interviewee, could be to outsource more tasks to protected employment. 
 
5.1.2 Trends and policies 
 
There were no real anti-crisis policies targeting the disabled. But there were anti-crisis measures that 
applied to the sheltered workshops, which employ many disabled.  
 
Schemes in Belgium (and later Flanders) tended to become broader and more generous until the 
Flemish government stepped on the brakes in 2010, partly because of the crisis (Samoy & 
Waterplas, 2012). In 2008 two wage cost subsidy schemes (CAO 26 and the VIP) were replaced by 
the Flemish Support Grant shortly called VOP I10. The VOP was unlimited in time and further 
broadened the scope of wage subsidies to local authorities, education and self-employment. The 
greater visibility, broader eligibility base, attractive subsidy levels and lack of review of this new 
scheme boosted take-up. The economic crisis and a change of government led to an overhaul of 
the system, with the aim of containing costs. In 2010 VOP II restrictions on subsidy duration were 
imposed and the pace of subsidy rate reduction was sped up (Ibid). 
 
The existing federal subsidies for disabled people were abolished in the early nineties but were 
reintroduced in 2011 by including this category of jobseekers into the ACTIVA scheme: jobseekers 
who find a job may keep their unemployment benefits for a variable period of time, while their 
employer may deduct this amount from the net wage payable (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). 
 
Policy is catching up with the trend of the increasing share of disabled with mental health problems. 
According to the interviewed Flemish government expert on the disabled the group with mental health 
problems is being targeted in Flanders by policies and experiments with specialized trajectories combining work, 
welfare and specialized care. With the W²-approach, combining work and welfare in pathways to work 
tailored to the person’s needs, Flemish policy takes a big turn in the positive direction. A new target group called ‘the 
MMPP’, which stands for people with medical, mental, psychological and psychiatric problems, was created in 
Flanders. Along with defining new groups like the ‘MMPP’, medicalization of problems has crept in. This trend 
evokes resistance according to our interviewee at the labour union. Until today the MMPP group is 
only being reached on a project base. Wallonia and Brussels also pay attention to this group. The 
Flemish government expert on older workers adds that it often concerns non-labour related problems 
(MMPP group) and that people in poverty also belong to this target group. According to the labour union 
interviewee the most vulnerable receive more policy attention as there is another new target group defined: people 
with a large distance from the labour market (33% disabled). According to him this is too little, too late, but defining 
the target group itself poses enormous opportunities. There are a lot of policy measures initiated but at the moment we 
are nowhere.  
 
10 The subsidy amounts to 40% of eligible labour costs (capped at twice the minimum wage) during the first year of employment, 30% 
during the next three years and 20% from the fifth year onwards for an indefinite period of time and without further review. However, 
the employer may apply, for an upgrade to up to 60% at any time when this is justified by circumstances (Samoy & Waterplas, 2012). 
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5.2 The position of migrants on the labour market  
5.2.1 Effects of the crisis 
 
The crisis had a strong negative influence on migrants, especially the non-EU nationals. Our 
interviewee at the labour union summarized the situation as ‘it’s going from bad to worse’. The 
employment rate of non-EU nationals kept on decreasing after 2008 were it started to increase 
again in 2009 for other EU-nationals. Non EU-nationals went from an employment rate of 39.9% 
in 2008 to 36.6% in 2012. The employment rate of other EU-nationals stayed close to that of 
Belgian nationals and went from 62.40% in 2008 to 62.07% 2012. The employment rate gap with 
Belgian nationals increased between 2008 and 2012 with 3.54 ppts for non-EU nationals (from 
23.27 ppts to 26.81 ppts) and with 0.17 ppts (from 0.72 ppts to 0.90 ppts) for other-EU nationals 
(own computations, based on data in appendix). 
 
The unemployment rate of the three nationality groups mirrors the double cyclical downturn but 
the unemployment rate of migrants reacts stronger than that of Belgians, with the strongest 
reaction amongst non-EU nationals. Belgian nationals end up with an unemployment rate of 6.53% 
in 2012 versus a rate of 6.34% in 2008, for other-EU nationals and non-EU nationals these rates 
amount to 11.14% versus 9.15% and 30.74% versus 27.40% respectively. The unemployment rate 
gap with Belgian nationals increased between 2008 and 2012 with 1.80 ppts (from 2.81 ppts to 4.61 
ppts) other-EU nationals and 3.14 ppts (from 21.06 ppts to 24.20 ppts) for non-EU nationals. 
5.2.2 Trends and policies 
 
According to our interviewees at the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, 
structural factors explain the effects of the crisis for immigrants (they explain also why we are doing so badly in 
European perspective).  
- Firstly, the rigid EPL means that employers are very risk averse in hiring.  
- Secondly immigrants are often employed in sectors that are vulnerable to economic downturns like 
construction and industry (CGKR, 2012, p. 123).  
- Thirdly, immigrants work often in low quality jobs, often in short term contracts or tempagency work. This 
means that when a negative demand shock hits they are the first to go, together with youth. Our interviewees 
further state that these short term jobs normally work as a stepping-stone into better quality jobs, but for 
immigrants the stepping-stone-effect is less than for other groups. They stay in short term jobs for a longer 
time.  
 
A report of the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue and the Centre for 
Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (2013, p. 311) also finds that there is an 
etnostratification of the labour market according to statute: blue collar versus white collar worker. 
This could be a further explanation. The new uniform statute for both types of workers as of 2014 
should remedy this. 
 
Education, however, is not a conclusive explanation for the effects of the crisis. The National Bank 
of Belgium interviewees mentioned surprising results when educational level is taken into account. 
Looking at the educational level, the middle and higher educated non-EU immigrants got hit the 
worst. Their employment rate decreased between 2008 and 2010 with 1.9 and 2.4 ppts respectively 
versus a decrease of 1.1 ppts for the low educated. But there are still mayor differences in the 
 
 57 
employment rate levels. The lower educated non-EU nationals still have the lowest employment 
rate. 
Table 5.1 Employment rate according to personal characteristics 2008 versus 2010 
 2008  2010  
Sex Born in Belgium Born outside 
EU-27 
Born in Belgium Born outside 
EU-27 
Male 69.2% 60.2% 68.5% 56.5% 
Female 58.2% 36.6% 58.7% 36.9% 
Age     
15-24 27.8% 19.7% 25.6% 19.2% 
15-24 (excl. 
students) 
74.5 43.2% 69.4% 43.8% 
25-49 85.6% 56.3% 85.0% 54.4% 
50-64 48.8% 40.8% 52.2% 39.2% 
Educational 
level 
    
Low 40.1% 34.2% 39.6% 33.1% 
Middle 68.1% 53.7% 66.9% 51.8% 
High 84.3% 68.4% 83.5% 66.0% 
Total 63.8% 48.1% 63.6% 46.5% 
 
Source CGKR, 2012, p.123, FOD Economie, Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie, LFS. 
 
The statistics further reveal who amongst non-EU immigrants got hit the worst. When crossing 
the age and birth nationality it seems that the crisis mainly affected older non-European 
immigrants. The employment rate in the age category of 50-64 year olds born outside the EU-27 
decreased between 2008 and 2010 with 1.6 ppts. Amongst the young immigrants from outside the 
EU-27 (15-24 years of age excluding students) the employment rate interestingly enough increased 
slightly with 0.6 ppts while that of Belgian youth decreased with 5.10 ppts. But we have to keep in 
mind that there is still an employment rate gap of around 30 ppts between them.  
 
There was no (anti-crisis) policy directly aimed at the position of immigrants on the labour 
market. As the immigrant population for a large part consists of young people and low educated 
they were indirectly covered by anti-crisis measures directed at these groups. 
 
5.3 The position of youth on the labour market  
5.3.1 Effects of the crisis 
 
Employment amongst youth showed a decline of 2.14 ppts, from 27.40% in 2008 to 25.26% in 
2012. When students are excluded the employment rate decreased with 4.41 ppts, from a level of 
72.01% in 2008 to 67.60% in 2012. Youth end up with a lower employment rate than in the year 
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2000, i.c. 29.04% (data excluding students are not available before 2007). The employment as well 
as the unemployment rate mirrored the double dip in economic activity. In 2008 17.97% of youth 
was unemployed versus 19.75% in 2012, an increase of 1.78 ppts. In 2000 the unemployment rate 
stood at 17.55%.  
 
According to De Mulder & Druant (2011) the employment of low educated young people was the 
first to suffer from the slowdown in the business cycle, while at the crisis peak, it was employment 
amongst persons with medium qualifications that recorded the most marked decline. On the other 
hand, employment amongst highly-qualified workers grew during and after the crisis. But there are 
regional differences as the High Council of Employment finds that in Wallonia high educated 
suffered more from the crisis than the low educated. This may be caused by the fact that more and 
more young people enter the labour market with higher education qualifications, but also that some 
high educated profiles are less in demand, which in times of economic downturn, may affect their 
employment opportunities (HRW, 2013, p.50). But all the interviewees agree that it is mainly low 
educated youth that we should be worried about. 
 
Labour Force Survey data show an increase in the NEET-rate11 (15-24 year olds) and in the 
percentage of unqualified school leavers12 (18-24 year olds) as of 2008. The interviewed youth 
expert mentioned a possible explanation for the increase in unqualified school leavers: Lower educated young people 
leave school to go to work to maintain household income levels, whereas higher educated tend to attend school longer 
(for more on this topic see Tumino & Taylor, 2013 and Lavrijsen & Nicaise, 2013). But there is 
criticism about the LFS indicator for unqualified school leavers (see a.o. Van Landeghem & Van 
Damme, 2009). When looking at administrative educational data, which are more accurate as they 
look at the population instead of a sample like in the LFS, there is a marked decline in the 
percentage of early school leavers between 2008 and 2010. According to Van Landeghem et al. 
(Van Landeghem, De Fraine, Gielen, & Van Damme, 2012) this decrease can mainly be ascribed to 
the fact that after 2008 more unqualified young people, particularly boys, chose not to drop out of 
school.  
5.3.2 Trends and policies 
 
There is discussion to what extent we should worry about the labour market position of youth and 
if there is a ‘lost generation’.  
 
According to our labour union interviewee since the 1980’s firms build a buffer of temporary and tempagency 
workers around their inner core of workers with a permanent contract. In case of a crisis and a decrease in demand 
this buffer which consists mainly of young people, is reduced. A big part of youth unemployment is cyclical. 
Because of this the rise in youth unemployment is not always conceived as problematic. Indeed, our 
interviewees at the FOD WASO mention this phenomenon, in addition to the fact that young people in Belgium in 
a European perspective are not that disadvantaged, to assuage unease and concerns related to youth 
unemployment. Because of the sensitivity to business cycle effects, youth will enter the labour market later than in 
normal circumstances (this is effectively the case according to Plasman, 2010). They add that they can’t deny 
that this will have negative effects though (cf. scarring-effects). The interviewed labour market researcher 
thinks that there will be scarring, but that the real question is how strong this effect is. He analyses the situation as 
follows: those youth who already had a weak position see their position weakened even more because of the crisis. 
11 This indicator shows the proportion of young people that are not following training or education and are not working in the age 
group of 15-24 year olds.  
12 The figures of unqualified school leaving represent the proportion of young people (18-24 years) with only lower-secundary 
education who did not participate in training during a reference period of four weeks.  
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Also in a recovery phase, young unemployed face competition from newly qualified entrants on the 
labour market without necessarily being able to claim significant work experience (NBB, 2011, 
p.59). 
 
According to the National Bank of Belgium (2012, p. 142), fears of a ‘lost generation’ should not be 
exaggerated because the number of young unemployed declined steeply when there was a revival in 
2011. They also mention the December 2011 government agreement that not only stipulates that 
this group will qualify sooner for activation and assistance in their efforts to find a job, but also 
replaces the waiting allowance-system for school leavers with a stricter system with a longer 
waiting period before benefits are provided and an insertion allowance that is now restricted in time 
to a maximum of 3 years. In addition, the enrollee has to fulfill new active search requirements 
before receiving the benefit and thereafter every sixth months (OECD, 2013a). This new scheme 
should encourage youth to start looking for work sooner and more actively (NBB, 2012). Our 
labour union interviewee expressed concern about this scheme and what will happen to those long term 
unemployed youth who are nearing the end of their 3 year period. He observes that the idea of workfare is gaining 
strength, especially in Flanders, where people on benefits become the scapegoat.  
 
The interviewed youth expert is also concerned. Putting efforts in activation and guidance is not enough because 
the problem seems to be the lack of (qualitative) jobs. Young people end up in the secondary segment of the 
labour market. Those low-quality jobs are usually a stepping stone, but because of the crisis, the stepping stone effect is 
absent, and people get stuck in flexible jobs without any future prospects. He further states that the large policy 
attention for employment activation increases the pistachio effect (as it is called in youth work) amongst 
employers. This ‘pistachio effect’ means that the harder nuts to crack are, the more they are left until 
later, or, at worst, simply disregarded, and it describes the paradoxical consequence of strategies 
that concentrate on imposing individual solutions to social exclusion (Tiffany, 2007 cited in 
Coussée et al., 2010). The youth expert continues that policy attention for labour market related skills and 
attitudes is needed, but also for working on self-reflection, self-esteem and the ability to process negative experiences. 
 
According to the experts of the Federal Public Service Employment Labour Social Dialogue youth 
got a lot of attention in anti-crisis measures, especially low educated youth entering the labour market with 
measures like the Win-Win plan (from January 2010 until the end of 2011) and the internships for low educated 
youth (‘instapstages’, 2013)13. Measures mainly targeted wage costs and getting people into a job. The labour 
union expert feels that measures against youth unemployment came quite late because it was supposed to be a 
temporary problem as the labour market position of youth is very sensitive to the business cycle. He warns that in 
times of crisis, policy should focus on youth as well as on older workers because the labour market becomes less 
dynamic, so the risk of communicating vessels goes up.  
 
 
 
 
13 The Win-Win plan introduced full or partial exemption from social security contributions for younger workers, where the degree of 
exemption depends on age, education level, and length of unemployment. It was also targeted at older unemployed and long-
term unemployed (Hoj, 2013). The system of entry-internships is targeted at low-qualified young people; the employer pays a 
monthly premium of 200 euros, whereas the National Employment Service pays a complementing training allowance.  
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5.4 The position of elderly workers on the labour market  
5.4.1 Effects of the crisis 
 
The crisis did not change the increasing trend in the activity rate nor in the employment rate of 
older workers. In 2012 the rates stood at 41.35% and 39.49% respectively, in 2008 at 36.10% and 
34.51% versus 26.8% and 26.1% in 2000. The unemployment rate mirrors the double dip in 
economic activity. In 2012 it stood at 4.49%, in 2008 at 4.36% versus 3% in 2000.  
 
A number of interviewees point out the cohort effect of higher female participation on the labour 
market. This makes it hard to say what effect the crisis had. According to the interviewed labour 
market researcher the crisis probably slowed down the upward trend but the question to what extent is hard to 
answer. The National Bank of Belgium experts think of the steady rise of the employment rate of older workers 
as surprising because in the past we would have seen more effect of a crisis. On the other hand they think of it as a 
logic consequence of all the measures that were taken in the last decade concerning older workers (e.g. reforms 
concerning the retirement age and early retirement schemes, the time credit system). The interviewees at the 
Federal Public Service Employment Labour and Social Dialogue (FOD WASO) also think of these 
measures as an important explanation, but they note that it’s hard to tell if they indeed have an effect because there is 
no counterfactual.  
5.4.2 Trends and policies 
 
The 2005 Generation Pact did not have the expected impact on the effective retirement age 
(OECD, 2013a). But in 2009 the statutory pension scheme for women was aligned with that of 
men by gradually raising the standard retirement age from 60 to 65 years and extending the length 
of working life necessary to qualify for a full pension from 40 to 45 years (NBB, 2012, pp. 140-141). 
As of 2012 with the new 'unemployment with company surcharge’ scheme, eligibility requirements 
for early retirement got stricter, early exit or pre-retirement systems are gradually rolled back, the 
reference period for the calculation of benefits was extended, and pension rights accrued during 
periods of inactivity were reduced. According to the NBB (2012, pp140-141) the effect of these 
measures is clear as the proportion of people in the 55-64 age group using the various schemes 
permitting an early exit from the labour market fell by around 10 ppts in a decade (2000 vs. 2011), 
to reach 39% of the social security system. 
 
Measures were introduced to improve the employment prospects of older workers such as the 
obligation for larger firms to develop strategies for boosting employment of older workers 
(‘employment plans for older workers’ in 2013) (OECD, 2013) and the obligation for employers to 
provide active support to dismissed workers (older than 45 years) in their exploration for new job 
opportunities (outplacement policies). In addition, the government invests in initiatives to keep 
older workers longer at work, to make jobs more ‘workable’ for older people (e.g. diversity plans 
for companies). But according to the Flemish government expert on older workers the workability as 
measured by the Workability Monitor (SERV) for the total population increased but for older workers there was 
not a lot of change despite of all the measures. 
 
Measures regarding wage costs are indirectly taken through a plethora of subsidies for older 
workers on the federal and regional level. When asked about the effectiveness of these measures 
the Flemish government expert on older workers assessed that employers would not hire older workers 
only because of these measures, nevertheless the effects shouldn’t be underestimated. Employers mainly talk about the 
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wage cost problem of older workers. The problem is that there are so many different subsidies and they are not always 
well geared to one another. In addition Belgium is a country of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME’s) and they 
don’t always have the means to do the administration needed to apply for the subsidies. The government expert 
told us that surveys reveal that these measures are not very well known by employers, and she thinks that this could 
also be an SME-effect.  
 
According to the government expert on older workers Flanders was the first to change the passive 
employment policy for older workers with the introduction of the ‘systematic approach’ for 50-52 year olds in 
2009. This approach entails quick contact, screening and intensive coaching and mediation by specially trained PES-
consultants (50+consultants) and labour union consultants. According to a study by Bollens (2011) this 
approach significantly increased chances to move into a job with 3 to 4 ppts (for 50-52 year olds). 
In 2011 and 2012 this approach was extended to respectively 53-55 and 56-57 year olds. Another 
policy aimed at activating older unemployed is the back-to-work bonus, which encourages older 
unemployed (55+) to take up work by offering them a monthly supplement, paid for by the 
National Employment Office in addition to the wage of the worker.  
 
There were no real anti-crisis measures targeted at older workers except the 2010 Activa Win-
Win plan (see above). The crisis may have provided a momentum for changing early retirement 
legislation. The government expert on older workers nuances this: it was mainly the budgetary scarceness 
that made this possible but of course the crisis worsened this scarceness. According to the Federal Public 
Service Employment Labour Social Dialogue, youth got a lot of policy attention since the crisis, but there was 
never a political signal that the older workers weren’t important anymore. The idea that the employment of youth and 
older workers are incompatible has been left according to them. 
 
According to our labour union interviewee the policies or laws aimed at employers are often “laws without 
teeth”, without sanctions if not obeyed. The Flemish government expert on older workers doubts if 
increasing enforceability will work. The instruments to make things enforceable are more easily available on the 
side of the unemployed than on employer’s side. She thinks that a mentality change amongst employers as well as 
incentives to hire/keep older workers is needed.  
 
In recent years a willingness to change structural problems and a mentality change amongst employees and 
employers is observed by the government expert on older workers. Politicians often speak of the need of 
everyone working longer, the solidarity needed amongst the generations, the implications of population ageing, shortages 
on the labour market, etc.   Amongst employees there is a growing awareness that they will have to work longer. 
Employers are beginning to realize that they will have to change their mentality towards older workers because of the 
(future) shortages. The expert notices a large demand from companies for support relating to employing older workers 
(the Flemish government provides this in various ways). But things are changing slowly, the expert still notices a lot of 
prejudice and a high threshold for employers. In the experience of the expert the threshold disappears once an employer 
hires an older worker. Employers then emphasize the attitudes of older workers like punctuality and loyalty. 
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5.5 The position of other relevant vulnerable groups on the labour market: the low 
qualified  
5.5.1 Effects of the crisis 
 
The employment rate amongst the low educated decreased between 2008 and 2012 with 1.71 ppts 
(from 49.43% to 47.72%), while that of the middle educated decreased with 1.25 ppts (from 
74.74% to 73.49%) and that of the high educated with 0.16 ppts (from 84.72% to 84.56%). The 
high educated ended up with the almost the same employment rate as in 2000, while that of the 
middle educated was 1.05 ppts lower and that of the low educated was 2.55 ppts lower.  
 
The crisis is clearly visible in the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate of the low educated 
reacted the strongest to the crisis: it increased between 2008 and 2012 with 1.24 ppts (from 10.84% 
to 12.08%), while that of the middle educated increased with 0.98 ppts (from 5.72% to 6.70%) and 
that of high educated with 0.26 ppts (from 3.17 % to 3.43 %). Low educated and medium educated 
workers are in a worse off position compared to the year 2000: their unemployment rate gradually 
increased with 2.25 ppts and 1.41 ppts respectively. High-educated are better off, their 
unemployment rate decreased with 0.72 ppts compared to 2000.  
 
Our interviewees at the National Bank Belgium (NBB) state that a low level of education is a 
transversal feature among the various defined Inspires target groups and this characteristic seems to 
be an important explanation for the extent to which they are hit by the crisis.  De Mulder and 
Druant (2011) observe an inverse relationship between the sensitivity of employment during 
the crisis to the business cycle and the level of education: the least qualified workers are the 
first to suffer the consequences of the fluctuations in activity and are the most severely affected. 
 
5.5.2 Trends and policies 
 
Underneath these quite steady employment figures lie important differences between man and 
women. The employment rate of low educated men decreased much stronger than that of women 
(HRW, 2013). The service voucher scheme was an important factor to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis as it created jobs that were mainly taken up by low-educated women.  
 
The High Council of Employment observes that the employment of low educated became less 
stable between 1998 and 2011. They found several reasons for this: on the one hand, the low 
educated are overrepresented in industries that are significantly restructured in recent years and, on 
the other hand, they experience more difficulties signing employment contracts for an indefinite 
period (tempagency and temporary contracts increased faster in this group than in the other 
educational groups) (HRW, 2013, p.14). 
 
The interviewed youth expert observes that the low qualified are in danger of exclusion as well on the 
secondary labour market, due to various reasons including downsizing, higher demands associated with training and 
educational levels, attitudes and displacement effects. The High Council of Employment agrees: 
‘Against the background of a general increase in unemployment, higher educated are willing to 
lower their requirements regarding the quality of work and the level of remuneration (HRW, 2013, 
p.23)’. 
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According to the High Council of Employment, the yet substantial tax cuts have not enabled the 
employment rate of low-educated to increase. The number of vacancies reserved for this group is 
still insufficient and they also face competition from higher educated job seekers (HRW, 2013, p. 
24-25).  
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6 |  Factors affecting the position of vulnerable groups  
 
In the table below we present a comparative overview of evolutions in the employment and 
unemployment rate of the vulnerable groups in Belgium. The disabled are not included because we only 
have (reliable) figures on the employment rate evolution between 2007 (2nd quarter) and 2012 of people 
experiencing hindrance in Flanders, this went down with 4 ppts (see data in appendix). 
Table 6.1 Evolutions of the labour market position of vulnerable groups in Belgium (ppts) 
Vulnerable groups 
Employment rate Unemployment rate 
2012-2008 2012-2000 2012-2008 2012-2000 
Working age population (15-64) -0.55 1.70 0.58 0.51 
Youth (15-24) -2.14 -3.78 1.78 2.20 
Youth (15-24, excl. students) -4.41 NA NA NA 
Older workers (55-64) 4.98 13.37 0.13 1.50 
Other EU-country nationality (15-64) -0.33 3.77 2.00 1.09 
Non-EU nationality (15-64) -3.69 2.87 3.34 0.99 
Low qualified (25-64) -1.71 -2.55 1.24 2.25 
 
Source own computations, based on LFS data in appendix 
 
The disabled, youth and non-EU nationals were hit the hardest by the crisis. However, when comparing 
the situation in 2012 with those in 2000 the employment rate of non –EU nationals increased. The biggest 
losers for the 2000-2012 period are the low qualified and youth. The evolution in the youth employment 
rate can be biased by evolutions in the student population. Older workers have improved their position on 
the labour market based on these indicators. In spite of their higher participation on the labour market, 
their position is ‘au fond’ not less vulnerable. Getting out of unemployment is a rare phenomenon for 
older workers and keeping them at work still requires supportive measures.  
 
In the table below we present a comparative overview of the factors that emerged from the interviews as 
an explanation for the vulnerability of certain groups. The first four institutional filters are based on 
Buchholz et al. (2006), and were completed by filters inductive from the research (see box). 
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Institutional filters – adapted from : Buchholz et al. (2006, pp. 12-18) 
The employment relations system, in which a distinction is made between open employment relationships which 
are “decentralized, dualistic and based on free market forces”, such as in the case of the US and the UK, and 
coordinated market economies with strong unions and centralized procedures of negotiation. This distinction 
impacts the employment protection systems (the stronger the unions are, the stronger employment protection will 
be) and therefore the ease to adapt to structural change (more adaptability in open employment relationships, 
where dual labor markets are likely to emerge). Mobility will therefore be higher and the rate of early retirement 
lower in the former type of economies. By contrast, in coordinated systems labor exit will mainly take place through 
early retirement, on the condition that the pension schemes provide enough financial incentives to do so (cf. infra), 
and due to the strength of employment protection mobility will be lower. 
Occupational structures and labor market boundaries refer, in this context, to the extent to which the structure of 
labor markets and labor market policies encourages or discourages employees to be mobile in response to 
technological change. That structure is closely related to both the educational system, by which skills are produced 
and maintained, and the policies relating to lifelong learning. On the one hand, it is hypothesized that countries 
with well-developed, standardized vocational training systems, such as Germany, will create rigid labor markets, 
where mobility will be cumbersome, and that adjustment of older workers to economic change will happen 
through early retirement. On the other hand, countries where skills are acquired through on-the-job training both 
job-to-job (US, UK) and occupational mobility is likely to happen.  With regard to the provision of lifelong learning, a 
difference is made between a first category of countries (Southern and Central Europe), where training is limited to 
an early period in life and therefore has a larger impact on the workers’ career, and a second one (liberal and 
Scandinavian countries) where re-training opportunities are provided throughout the life course. 
Employment-sustaining policies of the welfare state. The last domain refers to the ensemble of those policies which 
are explicitly aimed at facilitating employment and at re-integrating unemployed workers (active labor market 
policies), such as the provision of job search assistance, start-up grants, subsidized employment, mobility grants, 
fiscal incentives, social services, limits in the duration of benefits or mandatory participation in labor market policy 
schemes (for a full typology of active labor market policies see Eichhorst et al., 2008, p. 6). It follows that those 
countries where such measures are scarce or only focused on younger workers (Italy, Germany), have been less 
successful in fostering the prolonged employment and job transitions of older people as opposed to Scandinavian 
welfare states. 
 
The pension system and welfare arrangements, that points at the incentives for retirement such as the minimum 
number of years required to qualify for a public pension, the cumulated duration of previous pension contributions 
and penalties for working after retirement, the generosity of benefits and the existence of functional equivalents to 
pensions that have already been described above. It follows that less generous systems such as those of liberal 
welfare regimes (UK, US) are characterized by later retirement than systems with high wage replacement, such as 
those of Central and Southern Europe. Scandinavian countries are situated in the middle. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 6.2 Comparative overview of factors affecting the position of vulnerable groups 
Institutional filters Disabled Migrants Youth Older workers Country specific: 
Low educated 
Employment relations system 
(wage setting) 
 − High wage costs and 
strict EPL makes 
employers risk averse 
(discrimination) 
− High wage costs and 
strict EPL makes 
employers risk averse 
− high wage costs 
(age/seniority based 
wage system) 
− EPL and 
outplacement and 
early retirement 
regulations 
− High wage costs and 
strict EPL makes 
employers risk averse 
Occupational system and 
labour market boundaries 
 − Educational system 
(Differences in 
educational 
outcomes between 
the second 
generation and 
natives are higher 
than in other 
countries - 
deterministic 
schooling system) 
− Recognition of 
foreign diplomas 
− Non-standard jobs 
− Etnostratification of 
the labour market 
according to statute 
− Often employed in 
sectors that are 
vulnerable to 
economic downturn 
− Educational system 
(vertically segmented 
schooling system 
with high retention 
rates and too early 
tracking) 
− Mismatch between 
education and the 
labour market  
− LIFO-principle 
− Non-standard jobs 
− Lack of investment 
in LLL 
− Diploma culture 
when hiring 
− Lack of retention 
policy in companies 
 
− Diploma culture 
when hiring 
− Deterministic 
schooling system  
− Non-standard jobs 
− Often employed in 
sectors that are 
vulnerable to 
economic downturn 
− Risk of displacement 
by higher qualified 
 
 Employment-sustaining policy 
(ALMP’s) 
− Period of personal 
(on the job) coaching 
is not always long 
enough. 
 
− Lack of targeted 
policy 
− Transition from 
school to work 
− Policy is mainly 
targeted at getting 
people to work 
longer /keeping 
them in a job and 
less targeted at the 
(re)hiring of older 
workers 
− Lack of activation 
and support from 
the PES 
 
Pension and welfare system − Panacea of benefit 
schemes which are 
not all equally 
activating 
− Unemployment/ 
inactivity traps 
 − Early retirement 
schemes 
− Unemployment traps 
Individual characteristics − Productivity losses − Language proficiency  
(vs language 
requirements of 
employers) 
− Type of migration: 
mainly family 
reunification 
− Less  developed 
social networks and 
information 
asymmetries  
− Unqualified school 
leaving  
− Scarring  
  
Norms − System based on a 
deficit approach 
− Prejudice / 
discrimination 
 − Prejudice / 
discrimination 
− culture of early 
retirement 
 
Policy 
(Governance & Content) 
 
− Mix of competencies 
between different 
state levels  
− Mix of competencies 
between different 
state levels  
− Mix of competencies 
between different 
state levels  
− Mix of competencies 
between different 
state levels  
− Mix of competencies 
between different 
state levels  
  
 − Complexity of 
(competing) wage 
subsidies  
− Employement and 
job retention of 
disabled are on a 
voluntary basis (no 
quota) 
  − Enforceability  
Interaction factors  − Geographical 
mismatch and low 
geographical mobility 
− Labour supply and 
demand mismatch 
(due to 
delocalization, 
import from low 
wage countries and 
skill biased 
technological) 
− Geographical 
mismatch and low 
geographical mobility 
− Labour supply and 
demand mismatch 
(due to 
delocalization, 
import from low 
wage countries and 
skill biased 
technological) 
− Geographical 
mismatch and low 
geographical mobility 
− Labour supply and 
demand mismatch 
(due to 
delocalization, 
import from low 
wage countries and 
skill biased 
technological) 
− Geographical 
mismatch and low 
geographical mobility  
− Labour supply and 
demand mismatch 
(due to 
delocalization, 
import from low 
wage countries and 
skill biased 
technological) 
− Geographical 
mismatch and low 
geographical mobility 
− Labour supply and 
demand mismatch 
(due to 
delocalization, 
import from low 
wage countries and 
skill biased 
technological) 
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To conclude we list some notable observations.  
− Quantitative indicators on the vulnerable labour market position of certain groups 
should be handled with care as there are often methodological issues (e.g. administrative 
versus survey data, self-assessment, small sample size) or country specific factors (e.g. type 
of migration, compulsory schooling age) that complicate interpretation. 
− An important hiatus are data on the disabled at the Belgian level. Despite their limitations 
quantitative indicators can give important insights, so follow-up should be pursued also for 
the disabled.  
− Within the studied vulnerable population groups there is heterogeneity for what regards 
vulnerability. Being low educated is a characteristic that runs transversally through all of 
the defined vulnerable groups and that can often explain the extent to which they are 
vulnerable. 
− The crisis hit vulnerable groups harder, and in that way increased the distance from less 
vulnerable groups except for older workers.  
− In spite of various anti-crisis measures and structural reforms to important labour market 
institutions (i.e. the retirement system and unemployment benefits) and a more activating 
labour market policy since the 2000s some fundamental factors that make the discussed 
groups vulnerable did not change (much). Examples are their employment in industries 
that are sensitive to economic fluctuations, the lack of mobility (insiders versus outsiders, 
from secondary to primary labour market, intra and intersectorial), mismatches on the 
labour market, high wage costs (especially in international perspective), the deterministic 
schooling system, …  
− The crisis changed the position of vulnerable groups but did however not change the 
essence of their vulnerability. Their vulnerability is for a large part an emanation of the 
characteristics and structure of the Belgian labour market. 
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appendix 1 Statistics 
a1.1 Regional indicators of the labour market 
 
Table a1.1 Activity rate (15-64 year olds) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 66.40 66.10 66.80 66.80 68.00 68.60 68.40 69.10 69.20 69.20 69.90 69.15 69.04 
Walloon 
region 61.80 61.50 61.40 62.20 62.60 63.70 63.60 63.70 63.60 63.30 64.10 62.97 63.71 
Brussels 
capital 
region 63.40 62.00 63.90 63.10 64.30 65.70 64.90 66.10 66.20 65.50 66.30 64.94 65.38 
Belgium 64.60 64.20 64.80 64.90 65.90 66.70 66.50 67.10 67.10 66.90 67.70 66.72 66.94 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
 
Table a1.2 Employment rate (15-64 year olds) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 63.50 63.43 63.52 62.94 64.31 64.90 64.98 66.13 66.48 65.77 66.29 66.19 65.89 
Walloon 
region 55.67 55.35 54.90 55.44 55.05 56.08 56.12 56.98 57.23 56.23 56.73 56.97 57.26 
Brussels 
capital 
region 54.51 53.92 54.51 53.19 54.07 54.83 53.45 54.76 55.60 55.09 54.78 53.83 53.96 
Belgium 60.15 59.94 59.89 59.59 60.33 61.07 60.99 62.05 62.40 61.60 62.01 61.92 61.85 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Table a1.3 Unemployment rate (15-64 year olds) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Flemish 
region 4.34 3.99 4.92 5.71 5.45 5.46 4.99 4.36 3.95 4.96 5.19 4.29 4.55 
Walloon 
region 10.37 9.95 10.61 10.87 12.06 11.93 11.75 10.53 10.07 11.22 11.50 9.53 10.12 
Brussels 
capital 
region 14.07 12.98 14.73 15.74 15.90 16.47 17.69 17.17 16.03 15.85 17.39 17.11 17.48 
Belgium 7.08 6.64 7.58 8.24 8.46 8.51 8.30 7.50 7.02 7.96 8.35 7.19 7.60 
 
* Break in the data 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
a1.2 The Disabled 
Table a1.4 Employment rate of people experiencing hindrance, Flemish region (%) 
Survey* Total 
population  
People 
experiencing 
hindrance  
Hindrance to 
some extent 
Hindrance to 
considerable 
extent 
LFS-2002 63.5 45.7    
LFS-2007 (2nd 
quarter) 20-64  
71.5  42.7  57.2  25.3  
LFS-2009 (year) 20-64  71.5  37.5  55.3  22.4  
LFS-2010 (year) 20-64  72.1  33.5  53.8  18.2  
LFS-2011 (year) 20-64  71.8  38.6  55.9  21.9  
 
* LFS 2002: Do you have a disability or do you suffer from a long-standing health problem? Yes- No. LFS 
2007-2009-2010-2011: Do you experience in your daily activities (at work or elsewhere) hindrances due to a 
disability, a long-term condition or illness (whether or not work-related) Yes, a lot. Yes, to some degree. No.  
Source Samoy, 2013b 
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Table a1.5 Employment rate of people experiencing hindrance in daily activities (20-64 years old), 
Flemish region (%) 
Hindrance 2007 (2nd 
quarter) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Yes, a lot 25.3 22.4 18.2 21.9 21.1 
Yes, to some 
degree 
57.2 55.3 53.8 55.9 
58.2 
Total 
experiencing 
hindrance  
42.7 37.5 33.5 38.6 
38.7 
Without 
hindrance  
77.4 76.0 77.3 77.0 
76.7 
Difference without 
hindrance – 
experiencing 
hindrance   
34.7 ppts 38.5 ppts 43.8 ppts 38.4 ppts 
38ppts 
 
* LFS 2007-2009-2010-2011: Do you experience in your daily activities (at work or elsewhere) hindrances due 
to a disability, a long-term condition or illness (whether or not work-related) Yes, a lot. Yes, to some degree. 
No 
Source Samoy, 2013 & FOD Economie – AD Statistiek en Economische Informatie – LFS 2012 Bewerking : 
Department WSE. 
 
 
Table a1.6 Employment rate of people experiencing hindrance in daily activities (20-64 years old), 
Belgium and its regions, 2012 (%) 
Hindrance Flemish region 
Brussels Capital 
region 
Walloon region  Belgium 
Yes, a lot 21.1 22.8 21.7 21.5 
Yes, to some degree 58.2 47.1 53.6 55.6 
Total experiencing hindrance 38.7 32.8 33.8 36.2 
Without hindrance 76.7 67.2 68.9 72.8 
Difference without hindrance – 
experiencing hindrance 
38ppts 34.4ppts 35.1ppts 
36.6ppts 
 
* LFS 2012: Do you experience in your daily activities (at work or elsewhere) hindrances due to a disability, a 
long-term condition or illness (whether or not work-related) Yes, a lot. Yes, to some degree. No 
Source FOD Economie – AD Statistiek en Economische Informatie – LFS 2012 Bewerking : Department 
WSE 
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a1.3 Migrants 
 
Table a1.7 Employment rate by nationality (15-64), Belgium 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgian 
nationality 61.71 61.08 60.97 60.67 61.33 61.99 62.02 62.91 63.12 62.51 62.83 62.95 62.97 
Other EU-
country 
nationality 58.30 56.87 56.89 56.05 57.13 59.37 58.69 61.18 62.40 59.56 62.33 62.21 62.07 
Non-EU 
nationality 33.29 32.86 32.61 32.54 35.44 34.85 34.33 38.20 39.85 38.80 38.22 37.39 36.16 
 
* Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27 
Source Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt WSE) 
 
Table a1.8 Unemployment rate by nationality (15-64), Belgium 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2010
* 2011 2012 
Belgian 
nationality 6.23 5.96 6.68 7.49 7.70 7.78 7.47 6.75 6.34 
7.15 7.52 
6.27 6.53 
Other EU-
country 
nationality 10.05 10.38 11.65 11.83 11.60 10.49 11.42 9.82 9.15 11.04 10.96 10.35 11.14 
Non-EU 
nationality 29.75 25.73 33.74 31.57 31.49 33.51 32.92 29.52 27.40 29.46 30.57 27.76 30.74 
 
* Break in the data; Until 2004 EU-15, as of 2005 EU-25, as of 2007 EU-27 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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a1.4 Youth 
 
Table a1.9 Employment rate of youth (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 33.66 34.48 34.35 32.57 32.80 31.80 32.02 31.55 31.67 28.62 28.76 29.39 28.14 
Walloon 
region 23.51 23.72 22.87 20.78 21.62 22.13 22.20 23.05 22.26 21.76 22.01 22.91 22.88 
Brussels 
capital 
region 20.23 21.26 21.92 19.08 19.70 19.30 20.68 19.62 20.97 19.07 16.56 17.73 17.54 
Belgium 29.04 29.68 29.37 27.36 27.79 27.31 27.58 27.49 27.40 25.32 25.23 25.99 25.26 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE 
Table a1.10 Employment rate of youth exclusive students (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2007-
2012 (%) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish region 80.59 81.60 77.31 76.46 77.08 77.28 
Walloon region 60.07 60.31 56.63 57.88 59.10 58.80 
Brussels capital region 50.11 54.67 51.63 45.72 45.34 46.45 
Belgium 70.78 72.01 67.69 67.09 67.61 67.60 
 
* School leavers are defined as youth (15-24) who indicate that they were student in year X-1 and not studying 
anymore in year X; NR: not reliable. 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Table a1.11 Employment rate of school leavers (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2007-2012 (%) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish region 67.57 71.72 61.58 63.19 62.35 62.88 
Walloon region 46.55 49.30 38.46 38.78 43.86 42.23 
Brussels capital region NR 52.81 47.10 NR NR 46.46 
Belgium 58.05 62.15 51.45 51.49 53.74 54.17 
 
* School leavers are defined as youth (15-24) who indicate that they were student in year X-1 and not studying 
anymore in year X; NR: not reliable 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Table a1.12 Unemployment rate of youth (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Flemish 
region 11.27 9.98 11.60 15.47 13.59 14.19 12.51 11.71 10.53 15.71 15.59 12.69 12.79 
Walloon 
region 27.01 28.27 26.47 31.68 33.06 31.99 31.32 27.79 27.55 30.47 30.01 25.16 27.07 
Brussels 
capital 
region 30.78 27.43 32.88 35.09 33.55 34.96 35.31 34.43 33.18 31.73 39.70 35.34 36.43 
Belgium 17.55 16.92 17.74 21.74 21.19 21.54 20.51 18.84 17.97 21.94 22.40 18.73 19.75 
 
* Break in the data 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Table a1.13 Unqualified schoolleavers (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 11.60 11.50 11.66 12.52 11.03 10.67 10.02 9.27 8.55 8.55 9.56 9.59 8.70 
Walloon 
region 15.50 15.80 16.09 16.10 15.31 14.59 14.77 14.33 15.17 13.81 13.74 14.73 14.80 
Brussels 
capital 
region 20.70 21.00 22.40 18.80 18.12 19.36 19.26 20.21 19.91 15.58 18.41 18.93 20.10 
Belgium 13.80 13.80 14.11 14.30 13.14 12.86 12.57 12.08 11.98 11.08 11.92 12.33 12.00 
 
* The figures of unqualified school leaving represent the proportion of young people (18-24 years) with only 
lower-secundary education who did not participate in training during a reference period of four weeks. 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Table a1.14 NEET rate (15-24 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.34 7.29 7.47 8.47 9.24 
Walloon 
region NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 14.59 16.11 14.62 15.21 15.36 
Brussels 
capital 
region NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 16.25 15.15 17.00 18.77 19.24 
Belgium 17.70 16.30 16.10 17.80 15.40 13.00 11.20 11.20 10.10 11.10 10.86 11.81 12.34 
 
* Break in the data, NA: not available; Deze indicator geeft het aandeel jongeren dat noch een opleiding volgt, 
noch aan het werk is in de leeftijdsgroep 15-24-jarigen 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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a1.5 Older workers 
 
Table a1.15 Activity rate (55-64 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 26.00 25.20 26.60 27.20 30.60 31.90 32.90 35.50 35.60 37.30 39.70 40.23 41.76 
Walloon 
region 25.70 25.30 27.10 29.90 30.40 33.90 33.40 34.90 35.20 34.50 36.80 38.62 39.06 
Brussels 
capital 
region 36.30 33.30 38.00 37.70 38.90 42.50 39.50 43.10 43.10 46.50 44.70 48.13 47.79 
Belgium 26.80 25.90 27.70 29.00 31.20 33.40 33.60 35.90 36.10 37.20 39.20 40.33 41.35 
EU-27 39.70 40.10 40.80 42.70 43.50 45.20 46.30 47.20 48.10 49.10 49.80 50.90 52.80 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Table a1.16 Employment rate (55-64 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flemish 
region 25.45 24.54 25.62 26.54 29.48 30.65 31.37 34.24 34.33 35.75 38.16 38.85 40.50 
Walloon 
region 25.24 24.62 26.15 29.11 29.38 32.25 31.91 33.62 33.59 32.68 35.11 36.93 37.12 
Brussels 
capital 
region 34.13 31.01 35.27 35.54 35.85 39.76 36.91 38.33 39.68 42.29 40.60 45.00 41.92 
Belgium 26.13 25.11 26.59 28.10 29.98 31.92 31.99 34.37 34.51 35.25 37.34 38.71 39.49 
 
* Break in the data 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Table a1.17 Unemployment rate (55-64 years old) in Belgium and its regions, 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Flemish 
region NR NR 3.79 NR 3.51 3.81 4.57 3.45 3.60 4.27 3.97 3.43 3.02 
Walloon 
region NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.58 NR 4.65 5.41 4.55 4.38 4.97 
Brussels 
capital 
region NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.00 9.15 9.23 6.51 12.28 
Belgium 3.00 3.21 4.08 2.97 3.89 4.41 4.76 4.24 4.36 5.11 4.63 4.03 4.49 
 
* Break in the data; NR: not reliable 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Table a1.18 Socio economic position of the Belgian population(50-64 years old), 2003-2011 (%) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Employed (fulltime + 
parttime) 42.38 43.50 45.81 45.71 47.97 48.00 49.06 50.93 51.60 
Fulltime employed 33.31 33.45 34.59 33.65 35.27 34.55 34.67 35.66 - 
Parttime employed 9.07 10.05 11.22 12.06 12.70 13.46 14.39 15.27 - 
Unemployed (PES) 2.35 3.28 4.30 4.94 5.15 5.27 5.67 5.95 5.92 
Older unemployed 
(PES), exempt from 
jobsearch obligations 8.16 7.52 6.70 6.03 5.46 4.97 4.58 4.22 3.88 
Fulltime prépension, 
exempt from jobsearch 
obligations 6.01 6.03 5.81 5.76 5.75 5.63 5.58 5.56 5.38 
Fulltime carreer break / 
timecredit 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.14 
Other inactive 40.84 39.36 37.01 37.22 35.36 35.87 34.93 33.19 33.08 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source VDAB, RVA, NBB, FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie - LFS 
(bewerking Departement WSE/Steunpunt WSE) 
a1.6 The low qualified 
Table a1.19 Employment rate according to educational level (25-64 year olds), Belgium 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Low 
educational 
level 50.28 49.06 48.76 48.93 48.78 48.97 48.99 49.79 49.43 47.96 48.91 47.72 47.72 
Middle 
educational 
level 74.55 73.96 73.82 72.76 73.06 73.99 73.19 74.19 74.74 74.01 74.49 74.00 73.49 
High 
educational 
level 84.63 84.56 83.74 83.60 83.87 84.19 83.60 84.90 84.72 84.22 83.99 84.19 84.56 
 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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Table a1.20 Unemployment rate according to educational level (25-64 year olds), Belgium 2000-2012 (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Low 
educational 
level 9.83 8.47 10.25 10.70 11.68 12.39 12.29 11.35 10.84 11.88 13.19 12.06 12.08 
Middle 
educational 
level 5.30 5.47 6.04 6.72 6.85 6.88 6.72 6.20 5.72 6.48 6.58 5.66 6.70 
High 
educational 
level 2.71 2.73 3.50 3.54 3.86 3.72 3.74 3.30 3.17 3.80 4.02 3.39 3.43 
Source FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - LFS, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
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appendix 2 Interviewees 
REPRESENTATIVES OF REGIONAL AND/OR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND 
OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES WITH COMPETENCES IN LABOUR POLICIES 
Name Position Institution 
1 Erik Samoy  Policy Staff member Flemish Government - Departement 
Work and Social Economy  
2 Lieve De 
Lathouwer 
Providing employment policy support; 
coördinator of the Centre of Expertise 
on Age & Employment; coördinator 
of Regional Checks 
Flemish Government - Departement 
Work and Social Economy - Centre of 
Expertise on Age & Employment 
(eL&W) 
3 Jan 
Vanthuyne 
Director general Belgian Federal Public Service 
Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue 
4 Tom Bevers Advisor Belgian Federal Public Service 
Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue - Department of employment 
and labour market studies 
INTERNATIONALLY OR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ACADEMICS IN THE 
FIELD OF LABOUR POLICIES AND VULNERABLE GROUPS 
Name Position Institution 
1 Joost 
Bollens 
Researcher HIVA-KU Leuven 
REPRESENTATIVES OF EMPLOYER ORGANIZATIONS, EMPLOYEE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOUR UNIONS WITH DEPTH 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS 
National Labour Unions 
Name Position Institution 
1 Chris 
Serroyen 
Head of the research department ACV 
REPRESENTATIVES OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OR NGOS DEFENDING 
THE RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS (DISABLED PEOPLE, YOUNG PEOPLE, 
MIGRANTS, OLDER WORKERS). 
Name Position Institution 
1 Michaël 
Bennetsen 
Member of staff / Researcher Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism 
2 Louise 
Callier 
Member of staff / Researcher Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism 
3 Robert 
Crivit 
Member of staff Uit De Marge vzw Steunpunt voor 
jeugdwerk en jeugdbeleid met kinderen 
en jongeren in maatschappelijk 
kwetsbare situaties 
ADDITIONAL EXPERTS 
Name Position Institution 
1 Philippe 
Delhez 
Research department National Bank of Belgium 
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2 Jan De 
Mulder 
Scientific support for the High 
Council of Employment 
National Bank of Belgium 
  
appendix 3 Map of relevant stakeholders in the country 
STAKE 
HOLDER NAME WEBSITE E-MAIL PHONE AREA 
MIGRANTS Minderhedenforum 
http://www.minderheden
forum.be/ 
info@minderhedenfo
rum.be 02/245 88 30 
Dutch spLFSing part of 
Belgium 
  
ADDE - Association pour le droit des 
étrangers http://www.adde.be info@adde.be 02 / 227.42.42 
French spLFSing part of 
Belgium 
  
Organisatie voor Clandestiene 
Arbeidsmigranten - OR.C.A. http://www.orcasite.be info@orcasite.be 
+32 2 274 14 
31 National 
  
Kruispunt Migratie Integratie - 
Expertisecentrum voor Vlaanderen - 
Brussel 
http://www.kruispuntmi.b
e/ info@kruispuntmi.be 02 205 00 50 Flemish - Brussels 
  Centre Bruxellois d'Action Interculturelle  http://www.cbai.be/ info@cbai.be 02 289 70 50 Brussels 
YOUTH de Ambrassade  http://ambrassade.be/ info@ambrassade.be 02 551 13 50 Flemish 
  Vlaamse Jeugdraad 
http://www.vlaamsejeugd
raad.be/contact/ 
info@vlaamsejeugdra
ad.be 02 551 13 80 Flemish 
  Conseil de la Jeunesse 
http://www.conseildelaje
unesse.be/ 
conseil.jeunesse@cfw
b.be 
02/413.29.30 – 
04/232.40.22 – 
0483/42.93.34 
French spLFSing part of 
Belgium 
  
la Confédération des Organisations de 
Jeunesse Indépendantes et Pluralistes http://www.coj.be/ info@coj.be  
00 32 2/218 31 
03 
French spLFSing part of 
Belgium 
OLDER 
PEOPLE Vlaamse ouderenraad 
http://www.vlaamse-
ouderenraad.be/ 
info@vlaamse-
ouderenraad.be 02 209 34 51 
Flemish - Dutch spLFSing 
part of Belgium 
 
Expertisecentrum Leeftijd & Werk 
(eL&W) 
http://www.leeftijdenwer
k.be/ 
lieve.delathouwer@w
se.vlaanderen.be 02-553 08 44 Flemish 
DISABLED 
PEOPLE 
Agence wallonne pour l’intégration des 
personnes handicapées www.awiph.be secgem@awiph.be T 071/205.711 Walloon 
GRIP vzw www.gripvzw.be info@gripvzw.be T 02/214.27.60 Flemish 
Vereniging voor mensen met een 
handicap http://www.vfg.be 02 515 02 68  Flemish 
Vlaams Agentschap voor Personen met 
een handicap http://www.vaph.be/ informatie@vaph.be 02 225 84 11 Flemish 
NGOs Vlaams Netwerk Armoede 
http://www.vlaams-
netwerk-armoede.be/ 
info@netwerktegenar
moede.be 02/204 06 50 
Flemish - Dutch spLFSing 
part of Belgium 
Belgisch netwerk armoedebestrijding 
http://www.bapn.be/?lan
g=2 info@bapn.be 02/265 01 53 National 
Réseau Wallon de Lutte contre la 
Pauvreté http://www.rwlp.be/ bureau@rwlp.be
 
+32 81 31 21 
17 Walloon 
Forum bruxellois de lutte  contre la 
pauvreté http://www.fblp.be/ info@fblp.be 02/600.55.66 Brussels - French spLFSing 
Brussel Platform Armoede 
http://www.brussels-
platform-
armoede.be/bpa/ 
gregory@brussels-
platform-armoede.be 0499 199.660 Brussels - Dutch spLFSing 
Vlaams Steunpunt Lokale Netwerken SLN http://www.sln.be/ info@sln.be 09 220 84 31  Flemish 
PUBLIC 
AGENCIES 
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en 
racismebestrijding http://www.diversiteit.be/ daco@cntr.be National 
SERV - Sociaal-Economische Raad van 
Vlaanderen  http://www.serv.be/serv serv@serv.be 02 20 901 11 Flemish 
CESW - le Conseuil économique et  social 
de Wallonie http://www.cesw.be/ info@cesw.be 04/2329811 Wallonia 
BNCTO - Brussels Nederlandstalig Comité 
voor Tewerkstelling en Opleiding  http://www.bncto.be/ info@bncto.be 02/235.18.90 Brussels 
Tracé Brussel vzw 
http://www.tracebrussel.b
e/ info@tracebrussel.be 02/511 99 72 Brussels 
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Actiris http://www.actiris.be/ Brussels 
VDAB http://www.vdab.be/ info@vdab.be Flemish 
Forem http://www.leforem.be/ Wallonia 
Arbeitsambt der DG http://www.adg.be/ 
German spLFSing 
community 
RVA NEO - National Employment Office http://www.rva.be/ 
TRADE 
UNIONS ACLVB - CGSLB Liberale vakbond http://www.aclvb.be aclvb@aclvb.be 09 222 57 51 National 
ABVV - Socialistische vakbond http://www.abvv.be 02 506 82 11 Flemish 
FGTB -Socialistische vakbond 
http://www.fgtb-
wallonne.be 08 126 51 52  Walloon 
Brussels ABVV - Socialistische vakbond 
http://www.abvvbrussel.ir
isnet.be 02 552 03 30 Brussels 
ACV - CSC Christelijke vakbond http://www.acv-online.be 02 246 31 11 National 
BUSINESS 
ORGANISAT
IONS 
Unie van Zelfstandige Ondernemers 
(Unizo) http://www.unizo.be service@unizo.be 078 35 39 39 Flemish 
Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen 
(VBO) http://vbo-feb.be/ info@vbo-feb.be 
+32 2 515 08 
11 National 
UCM - l’Association des Classes 
Moyennes http://www.ucm.be/ 
 
French spLFSing part of 
Belgium 
Belgische Boerenbond 
http://www.boerenbond.
be/ 
martine.tilkens@boer
enbond.be 016 28 60 00 National 
Vlaams netwerk van ondernemingen - 
VOKA http://www.voka.be/ info@voka.be 02 229 81 11 Flemish 
VERSO - Vereniging voor Social Profit 
Ondernemingen vzw http://www.verso-net.be/ info@verso-net.be 02/739 10 71 Flemish 
UWE - L'Union Wallonne des Entreprises  http://www.uwe.be/ info@uwe.be 010 47 19 40 Walloon Region 
FWA -Fédération Wallonne de 
l’Agriculture http://www.fwa.be/ fwa@fwa.be 081 60 00 60 Walloon Region 
UNIPSO - Union des entreprises à profit 
social http://www.ufenm.be/ unipso@unipso.be 081/24.90.20 Walloon Region 
BECI - Brussels Enterprises Commerce 
and Industries http://www.beci.be/ info@beci.be 02 648 50 02 Brussels 
Business and society 
http://www.businessands
ociety.be 
info@businessandsoc
iety.be National 
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